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THESIS

**PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES NEW TREND IN
EUROPE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE CZECH ARMED
FORCES**

by

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June 2002

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**PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCES NEW TREND IN EUROPE:
TRANSFORMATION OF CZECH ARMED FORCES**

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ABSTRACT

In 2001 the Czech Republic decided to abandon conscription in favor of professional armed forces. Western European countries are following the same trend, since the new security environment requires quickly deployable, highly skilled and well-equipped forces.

The current round of reforms started with Belgium and Netherlands, and have seen followed by France, Spain, Italy and Portugal. These countries are beneficiary from experience in United States and United Kingdom. The Czech Republic professionalization is the natural continuation of a process that started in 1999 with NATO membership. In 2001, the new Minister of Defense received the task of creating an all-volunteer force. A Plan to transition the armed forces was created. Transformation will likely start after the upcoming elections. The new concept should make the Czech Republic a more effective member of NATO.

This thesis concentrates on transition experience from conscription to volunteer forces with special attention to the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy. It discusses issues of procedures, processes, problems and their managerial solutions in the current environment of the Czech Armed Forces.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of this thesis is to look at European contemporary development in transforming military forces from conscripts to professionals. In particular, it investigates the implications for the Czech armed forces as they professionalize. There are a number of ongoing transformation processes in post-Cold War Europe, such as the economic transformation of Eastern European countries, reform of European Union institutions and the creation of a common currency. While relatively obscure in the public policy agenda, military professionalization has lately attracted increased interest with new sources of information now available. In 1993, there was a brief message that Belgium was abandoning conscription and creating professional forces. In 1996, the Netherlands announced it was switching to fully professional armed forces. In the same year, European powers, such as France and Spain, announced their intention to have professional forces in 2002. Next, Portugal and Italy also decided to transform their armed forces. In 2001, the Czech Republic announced its intention to transform to an all-volunteer force.

Until the end of the Cold War, most European countries used conscription systems. Only Great Britain had a volunteer force. Both the U.S. and UK have a long history of an all-volunteer force. So, what caused countries with a tradition of conscription to now change? What has changed for the Czech Republic to initiate the reform? Conscription and its features, how it evolved and what has changed will be examined. Next, the all-volunteer or professional force, its structures and rational will be explored. Then, both systems, noting their advantages and disadvantages, will be compared. A further step will be the exploration of European defense trends, requirements and tasks. In light of these changes, the goals of the Czech armed forces and how they would like to achieve them are discussed. Next, the experiences of the UK, the U.S., France, Belgium, Spain and Italy are examined in order to learn from these experiences.

Finally the Czech Republic and its political, economic, social and military conditions will be investigated. Our analysis of past experience will then be applied to better understand the process of transformation in the Czech armed forces.

A. BACKGROUND

In this study, the reasons why European countries are moving to all-volunteer or professional forces will be explained. The main research was based on experience, the process and the form of transformation followed in the United States and Great Britain. Also, information from countries using professional forces in Europe was researched. This information was gathered to analyze the decision of the Czech armed forces to develop an all-volunteer force. This information is then used to analyze the problems associated with transformation and how to avoid them, as well as generally address the management of these professional forces.

B. OBJECTIVES

The transformation of forces is examined in terms of needed management changes. What is needed for an all-volunteer force to work properly? Problems encountered by other countries in the transformation of forces are considered and reasons analyzed. Solutions are addressed. The main purpose is to help the Czech armed forces avoid possible pitfalls.

C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Primary question:

- What lessons learned by the professional military forces of the United States, Great Britain and other countries are applicable to today's Czech armed forces?

Secondary questions:

- What new challenges do the Czech military face?
- What is the useful body of knowledge about volunteer forces, and how is it applicable to the Czech Armed Forces?
- How should the experience of other countries be reflected in the organization and policies of the Czech armed forces?
- What are the new military requirements, and how are they changing the Czech military management?

- Based on analyses and evaluations of the previous questions, what recommendations can be made for the Czech military in order to properly function in the current military environment?

D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This thesis focuses on the Czech armed forces and their decision to create professional forces. Through studies of other countries, which underwent the same process, an attempt was made to find common problems and deficiencies. There were limitations in the availability of information from some European countries. Also, as attention has just now begun to be paid to this topic, the latest information had to be taken from Internet sources.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

The method used is inductive analysis of current professional defense structures, their management and the implications for the Czech armed forces. Descriptive analysis is used to analyze the historical evolution of conscription and the all-volunteer force. The needs and reasons for changing to professional forces are shown for specific nations. Processes and problems were evaluated by comparative analysis.

The information for this research is drawn from a literature search of books, journal articles, working papers, and Internet resources relevant to the subject.

F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This chapter provides a basic overview of the thesis approach and background information on the study. Chapter II provides a brief history of the Czech armed forces in light of the main events and political changes affecting the country. Chapter III discusses conscription and the all-volunteer system, changes in European military affairs and the perspectives of the Czech armed forces on this process. Chapter IV discusses the creation of all-volunteer forces in the United States, Great Britain and some European countries in the process of transformation to professional forces. Chapter V assesses the conditions in the Czech Republic from political, economic, social and military points of view. Chapter VI provides an analysis of the transformation processes, their problems, and the manner in which the Czech armed forces should proceed. Chapter VII summarizes the thesis and provides recommendations for the implementation of Czech reforms.

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II. HISTORY OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES

The Czech Armed Forces is a very young organization and next year will be celebrating the first ten years of its existence. To better understand the background of the Czech Armed Forces and the conditions preceding its creation, it is necessary to review what happened in 1918. In that year, two nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, signed the “Treaty of Pittsburgh”¹, which formed a joint state composed of these two nations. After the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy on October 28, 1918, the Czechoslovak State was declared.² It was also the beginning of the Armed Forces for the country’s defense needs. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces consisted of soldiers from the Austrian-Hungarian Army and the Czechoslovak Legions from Russia, France and Italy. The Armed Forces were burdened from the beginning because of disputes over borders and the war with Hungary. It was not until 1920 that they were able to unify domestic and foreign units.

In the same year on February 29, 1920, the Czechoslovak Republic introduced compulsory military service or conscription through a constitutional document.³ The document stated, “Every eligible citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic is obliged to comply with military training and country defense”. Conscription lasted 24 months and in 1924 was reduced to 18 months. Since then, conscription has been an essential part of the country’s military culture. General readiness was tested by partial mobilization in October 1921 against Hungary. The French military mission⁴, whose members occupied high military posts, played an essential role in creating the Czech military in the first half of the 1920’s.

1 John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, “Masaryk in America,” Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 55.

2 Jaroslav Opat, On the Emergence of Czechoslovakia, in “Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy Years from Independence”, ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1991), pp. 41-42.

3 <http://www.psp.cz/docs/texts/constitution.1920.html> - 121/1920 Sb., Zákon ze dne 29.února 1920, kterým se uvozuje Ústavní listina Československé Republiky, Branná Povinnost § 127; Constitutional Law of Czechoslovak Republic from February 29,1920, Compulsory Military Service § 127.

4 <http://vojenstvi.kvalitne.cz/armada/index.htm> - Československá Armáda Léta 1918-39 – Czechoslovak Armed Forces 1918-39.

Allied treaties with France against Germany and with Yugoslavia and Romania against Hungary were signed. In the second half of the 1920's, the Czech generals filled increasingly higher posts and the French military mission role was diminished. At the end of this decade, military development stagnated as a consequence of disarmament efforts and a reduction in military expenditures. This was especially apparent during the great industrial crisis at the beginning of 1930s.⁵ Groups of officers from the main headquarters prepared a plan for a radical reorganization and modernization of the Armed Forces. The two-year compulsory military service was introduced again, the number of infantry divisions was increased, the horse and mountain brigades were reorganized and a corps headquarters was established. In 1935, a build up of permanent fortifications began which was to reduce the strength of the very numerous enemy units in the case of war. Attention was also paid to motorization, the development of the Air Force, tanks and antitank defense.

In 1935, cooperation with the Soviet Union began with the signing of the treaty of mutual assistance.⁶ The political leadership also started to support the military by trying to find the requested financial resources. Public prestige rose and military expenditures were increasing. At the end of 1930s it was approximately 8% of the GDP. At the beginning of 1938, the reorganization of the Armed Forces was finished. Its peacetime strength was more than 200,000 men. That year was characterized by intensive preparations for imminent war. In May 1938, partial mobilization⁷ was declared, as was general mobilization in September of the same year.⁸ The fully mobilized Czech Armed Forces had 14 corps headquarters, 37 infantry divisions, 4 mobile divisions and approximately 1,100,000 men. Weapons consisted of 2,300 cannons, 350 tanks and 950 airplanes.

⁵ Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1989), p. 220.

⁶ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, Czechoslovakia 1918-92, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), pp. 62-70, 136.

⁷ Jaroslav Krejčí, From Ethnic to Political Nation, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990), p. 151.

⁸ Jaroslav Krejčí, From Ethnic to Political Nation, in Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990), p. 154.

Despite the fact that Czechoslovakia had a security agreement and military treaty with France, the four great powers (Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy) agreed on an end of border territories without even inviting the Czechoslovak representatives to Munich. After the acceptance of the terms of the Munich Agreement on September 30, 1938, Germany, Poland and Hungary occupied the borders.⁹ At the end of the year the Armed Forces were demobilized and dissolved after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.¹⁰ After the dissolution, many soldiers joined domestic or foreign resistance movements.¹¹ Czechoslovakia was sliced up and for six years disappeared from the map of Europe. In December 1943, exiled President Beneš went to Moscow and signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the USSR. After World War II, the expeditious reconstruction of the Armed Forces began. The Soviet Army was accepted as the sole model for the development of the new Czechoslovak Army.

The core of the forces were military units formed abroad during the war and complemented by newly created domestic units. Gradually, 16 infantry divisions were built which were complemented by tank corps and an artillery division. Also, five Air Force divisions were created. The Command of the Armed Forces faced shortages of manpower and material resources. Industry and the economy were recovering very slowly as a consequence of the reduced preparedness of the Army and also the Air Force. The military was involved in the repatriation of Germans¹², and helped industry and the fighting with small, armed groups in the country. Due to the aforementioned economic problems, the Armed Forces were reorganized in 1947 but reduced in size. Downsizing continued for the next few years.

⁹ Jaroslav Opat, *On the Emergence of Czechoslovakia*, in "Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy Years from Independence", ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991), pp. 112-113.

¹⁰ Jaroslav Krejčí, *In the Frontline Again*, in *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990), p. 162.

¹¹ *Czechoslovakia: A Country Study*, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1989), p. 223.

¹² *Czechoslovakia: A Country Study*, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1989), p. 223-224.

In 1947, "The Truman Doctrine" was announced as a new U.S. policy to protect nations against communism. In the same year, the European Recovery Plan known as the Marshall Plan¹³, was begun in which 22 European nations were invited to join and participate. The Soviet Union declined to attend and forced Czechoslovakia¹⁴, Poland and Hungary to also stay away. The Soviets backed the plan and at the same time communists overthrew the government in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.¹⁵ Czechoslovakia, like the other Eastern European countries, became a Soviet satellite. Bureaucratic centralism, under the direction of The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) leadership, was introduced in all spheres of public life. The new Czechoslovak People's Army (CSLA) lacked competent personnel because experienced non-communist leaders were replaced with pro-communist commanders. The initial purge was replaced by reorganization and the retraining of the Armed Forces by Soviet advisers to serve the needs and goals of the Soviet leadership. By 1952, about 53% of the officers had to leave the Armed Forces. Unquestionable political loyalty was more important than professional competence for advancement in the military hierarchy.

The Soviet Union assigned trusted communist party leaders to the most important East European military command positions despite their lack of military qualifications. The Army and its units used not only Soviet-made weapons and equipment but also their standards, regulations, organization and tactics. Soviet officers and instructors staffed the national military academies, and the study of Russian became mandatory for East European army officers. The Soviet Union also accepted many of the most promising and eager East European officers into Soviet mid-career military institutions and academies for the advanced studies essential to their promotion within the national armed forces command structures. A year after the communist takeover universal male conscription became law by drafting 18 years old men who were called up in the spring. Physical reasons or educational deferment were the only ways to avoid the draft.

¹³ Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1989), p. 224.

¹⁴ Jaroslav Krejčí, *In the Frontline Again*, in *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990), p. 177.

¹⁵ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 20.

The concentration of military forces was redirected towards the West German border. Leaders from Western Europe were at this time concerned about changes in the eastern part of Europe and especially with the Soviet Socialist Republic policies. The spread of communism and the forcible installation of communist governments was a threat to international stability and peace. The Berlin blockade in March 1948 led to negotiations and later to the creation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO was created on April 4, 1949 and signed by ten western European countries, the United States and Canada. After the purge of the Armed Forces and society in 1948, another started in 1950 within the Communist Party¹⁶ and it also especially affected the military because higher ranking officers or officers in higher posts had to be members of the Communist Party. This ensured the ideological connection between the party and military leadership.

The Minister of Defense, Ludvík Svoboda, was charged with treason and sent to work on a collective farm. In order to demonstrate their power, the Communists went so far as charge and execute the First Secretary of the Party, Slánský.¹⁷ The size of the military forces grew rapidly from 140,000 to 250,000 from 1950 to 1951. Even when morale was low because of the purges, they continued to strengthen the military forces by training and placing an increased emphasis on ideology. The new structure and reforms were the answer to the formation of NATO in Western Europe. In 1953, the total strength was 17 Army divisions, 10 Air Force divisions and 2 Air Defense divisions, which represented almost 300,000 men. All these changes led to joining the Warsaw Pact in May 14, 1955¹⁸. It was officially called the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”. The Warsaw Pact also helped to legitimize the presence of the Soviet troops and overwhelming Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Unlike Hungary and Poland, Czechoslovakia did not participate extensively in the resistance and riots during the upheavals in 1956.

¹⁶ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 25, 31-32.

¹⁷ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 151.

¹⁸ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 44 –45.

In 1958, the Armed Forces were organized and emphasized the maneuver character of contemporary war based on changes in the Soviet Armed Forces. The reorganization included 180,000 men in 22 divisions consisting of 1 Air Defense, 15 Army and 6 Air Force divisions. The Constitution of 1960¹⁹, which replaced the original communist constitution of 1948, converted the Czechoslovak Republic into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. According to the Constitution, “defense of the country and its socialist social order” was the “supreme duty and a matter of honor for every citizen.” Citizens were “duty bound” to serve in the armed forces as prescribed by law. The law provided for a system of universal male conscription. In early the 1960s, the Czechoslovak Armed Forces went through a modernization procedure to support the new Soviet strategy in its primary role on the western border with NATO countries. In the first half of the 1960s, forces were equipped with operational and tactical rockets. A new more powerful and better-educated force was built and trained to fulfill its role within the Warsaw Pact. It was estimated that Czechoslovakia would bear 60-70% of the casualties in case of war against NATO and would also be a nuclear battlefield.

During this time, pressure was put on the government to allow the installation of nuclear warheads and the relocation of more Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. After this proposal was refused, tensions between the two governments grew. Also, the requirements placed on the Czech military were increasing and general dissatisfaction with conditions and an aversion to their political education was spreading among the officers. After the Czechoslovak economy began to stagnate at the beginning of the 1960s²⁰, and because of pressure from Moscow and the party itself, a reform movement was created to address bureaucratic control and ideological conformity. In some government posts, younger and more liberal members of the communist party replaced the hard-liners. The Czechoslovak government rejected a request from Moscow for more military integration of the Warsaw Treaty in 1966 after the Romanian government rejected it.²¹

¹⁹ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 45.

²⁰ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 46.

²¹ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 88.

Liberalization also affected the Armed Forces and great structural changes were discussed to reflect democratic changes in society. During the "Prague Spring" in 1968, plans were created to democratize the Armed Forces, including limiting the authority of the communist party. The national military doctrine specified in the Action Program of the Ministry of Defense and by Memorandum of Military Political Academy stated that the defense of the country should be based on its own geopolitical interests. The main idea behind the documents was that the threat from the West was overstated, and was not so apparent as was perceived. In a televised news conference, at the height of the 1968 crisis, the chief of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's military department, Lieutenant General Václav Prchlík, denounced the Warsaw Pact as an unequal alliance, and declared that the Czechoslovak Army was prepared to defend the country's sovereignty by force, if necessary. First Secretary of the Party Alexander Dubček²² tried to assure Moscow of its country's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact but he was not convincing enough to prevent the invasion on August 20, 1968. That day, military forces numbering 500,000 from Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, led by Soviet Union troops, invaded Czechoslovakia.

On August 21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was occupied by these invading forces without any resistance.²³ Ludvík Svoboda²⁴, now President of the country, announced that the Warsaw Pact force entered the country without the approval of the Czech government. On the contrary, the Soviets claimed that they were invited to preserve socialism. The Czech Armed Forces did not participate because authorities confined them to their barracks. All military installations had been surrounded by troops, but according to orders from the Warsaw Pact command, they had not been disarmed. After three weeks, the forces were pulled back from military installations on October 16, 1968 and part of the Warsaw Pact forces were withdrawn. Only Soviet forces stayed in the western part of the Czech Socialist Republic with a force of four ground divisions.

²² H. Gordon Skilling, *Lions and Foxes: Heroes or Lackeys?*, in "Czechoslovakia 1918-88, Seventy Years from Independence", ed. by H. Gordon Skilling, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991), pp. 10-11.

²³ *Czechoslovakia: A Country Study*, ed. Ihor Gawdiak (Library of Congress, Federal Research Division 1989) p. 225.

²⁴ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 47.

During negotiations with the Soviets, a reduction in the number of Armed Forces was requested in order to stop military personnel from supporting reform in 1968. Due to the changes in society, the military was divided into pro-reform and pro-Communist factors. After the collapse of the Dubček regime, Husák²⁵ was appointed the new First Secretary of the Party in early 1969. His government started to regain control over the Armed Forces, and a new purge was carried out.²⁶ In first months after the invasion, about 58% of all army officers under 30 years of age resigned and by June 1969, an estimated 50% of all students in the country's military academies had also resigned. When the purge was completed in 1975, about 11,000 officers and 30,000 NCOs had been dismissed. The overall strength of the Army was reduced by one-third, and the Air Force by one-half. The manpower shortage had to be remedied with lower qualification requirements, and by material and career incentives. Overall strength dropped from 240,000 in 1966 to 168,000 in 1969. Both society and the Armed Forces suffered from apathy, and the prestige of the military disappeared in the eyes of the public and the military itself.

Despite the purges of possibly unreliable personnel and the redoubling of propaganda efforts in military schools and training programs, some outside observers in the 1970s and 1980s questioned the reliability of the Czechoslovak forces in the event of an East-West conflict. The most frequent questions concerned their reliability in a prolonged offensive war in Western Europe or in a war that was going badly for Warsaw Pact forces. Other outside analysts, however, believed that the Czechoslovak armed forces were well trained, well equipped, and well motivated and that they were capable of carrying their share of Warsaw Pact operations, particularly in defense of their homeland. In May 1970, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,²⁷ which incorporated the principle of limited sovereignty.

²⁵ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 195.

²⁶ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 48.

²⁷ <http://www.lupinfo.com/country-guide-study/czechoslovakia/czechoslovakia52.html>, Czechoslovakia Country Study, Normalization, 1987.

Soviet troops remained stationed in Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak armed forces worked in close cooperation with the Warsaw Pact command. Soviet advisers supervised the functioning of the Ministry of Interior and the security apparatus. During the 1970s and 1980s, Husák and his government tried to maintain conformity and obedience in all aspects of life. Consumerism and materialism were encouraged by a corrupt regime, and it caused cynicism, greed, nepotism, corruption and a lack of discipline at work. The Soviets continued to exert control over Czechoslovak internal affairs, including the police and security apparatus. Five Soviet ground divisions and two air divisions had become a permanent fixture, while the Czechoslovak military was further integrated into the Warsaw Pact. Any independent action was taken as defiance and the response to such activity was harassment, persecution, and, in some instances, imprisonment. Increasing tensions in relations between the USSR and United States or NATO and the Warsaw Pact was pervasive during the 1980s. New Soviet units were stationed in the country with nuclear weapon carriers.

On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soon after assuming office, Gorbachev began a policy of “restructuring” (*perestroika*) the Soviet economy and advocated “openness” (*glasnost*) in the discussion of economic, social, and, to some extent, political questions. For a government wholly dedicated to the preservation of the status quo, subjects such as “openness”, “economic restructuring,” and “reform” had been taboo. Huge military expenditures forced the USSR to the negotiation table with the United States and in 1987 an agreement was signed on the reduction of nuclear weapons. From 1987, Czech conscripts were by law serving for two years in the ground forces and for three years in the air forces. Any intentional avoidance was subject to a prison sentence of up to five years. Conscripts were obligated after the completion of their service to stay in the reserve forces until the age of 50. Peace initiatives with the USSR beginning in 1988 resulted in a reduction in the number of conventional weapons and personnel by 500,000 and 10 divisions.

By 1988, student demonstrations were organized, and change was demanded. Just about one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall²⁸, the end to communism in Czechoslovakia became a reality. The six-week period between November 17 and December 29, 1989²⁹ brought about the bloodless overthrow of the Czechoslovak communist regime.³⁰ Armed Forces were on alert in barracks but were not used because communist representatives were overwhelmed by the mass of people calling for democracy even though there were plans ready for military intervention. After the Cold War, a large number of officers left the military as they no longer shared the values of the service. Compulsory military service was reduced from 24 to 18 months, and civil service legislation was introduced. After the end of the Cold War, a dilemma appeared. What is the next step in the security of Europe and what are the roles of organizations such as NATO in these new conditions? The Warsaw Pact was dissolved on June 1, 1991 and NATO lost its main goal of collective defense against the communist threat. Some politicians predicted that this was the end of NATO and there was no need for this type of organization.

To stay viable and meaningful for its own members, it had to change its goals and principals to define its new role, although, on the basis of Article 5 (collective defense commitment). Soon after the Cold War, NATO started dialogs with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.³¹ Meanwhile, Eastern European countries were looking for security arrangements in the vacuum between NATO and Russia. In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, called the "Visegrad Group", agreed on a joint approach to security and foreign policy issues for better integration in Western European democratic civilization. The "Velvet Revolution" was successfully completed with the departure of the last Soviet troops in May 1991, and free parliamentary elections were held in June 1992. The dissident and playwright, Václav Havel, was elected president.

²⁸ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 48.

²⁹ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 100.

³⁰ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 103.

³¹ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 105.

The new government was forced to create a new military doctrine to fit the current conditions and circumstances of the country. Most of the attention was paid to economic changes while military needs were left for a later date. New threats, conditions and the history of the Armed Forces and the defense needs of the country indicated that a small Armed Forces be incorporated into European collective defense structures. The most visible and viable defense formation in Europe was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Lessons learned mainly from the Persian Gulf have resulted in changed in NATO's structure, which stressed the use of rapid reaction forces and the new concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Václav Havel, as the new president of Czechoslovakia and the first leader of a Warsaw Pact country, visited NATO headquarters in March 1991.³² He stated that the Czechoslovak Federative Republic would welcome cooperation and the exchange of information at different levels especially in security matters, broadened contacts between respective military officials as well as cooperation in science, information technology and environment protection. This search for security and safety became more important after the 1991 coup attempt against President Gorbachev.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)³³ was created to promote cooperation between NATO countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in security and related issues. Six months after the country's first regular nationwide elections in more than 40 years, on January 1, 1993, the Czechoslovak state was peacefully divided into the independent countries of the Czech and Slovak Republics due to "irreconcilable differences", thus, a 74-year-old federation was dissolved.³⁴ With the division of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic, the Czech Republic continued to privatize industry³⁵ and strengthen democratic control. The entire society was changing its social, economic and political dimensions. When the division occurred, the Czechoslovak Armed Forces strength was 169,000 men and 13 divisions.

³² Ladislav Holý, *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation*, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 139.

³³ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 50.

³⁴ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 106.

³⁵ Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonín, *Czechoslovakia 1918-92*, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996), p. 106.

The new Czech Armed Forces inherited two thirds of the personnel and equipment of the former Czechoslovak Army. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR) consisted of Ground Forces, Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The assigned strength by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty for the new Czech forces was about 93,000 men, 957 tanks, 1,367 armored personal vehicles, and 767 artillery systems above 100mm, 230 airplanes and 50 helicopters. In 1993, the Armed Forces were facing problems with the aging Soviet equipment and practices. The Czech military leadership had created the Concept for ACR development by 1996, but the decreased military budget influenced the entire process of implementation. The Partnership for Peace (PfP)³⁶ program began in January 1994 at Brussels after the NATO summit. It was the basis for the practical security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries (19+1) in the NACC framework. Activities included defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations.

The Czech Republic was very actively involved in PfP from the beginning and sought firm security arrangements. At the time of the creation of PfP, NATO members officially commenced a debate on enlargement. At that time, it was stated that active participation in PfP would play an important role in the expansion of NATO but without further clarification about what it meant. The idea of PfP constituting a possible path to NATO membership was allegedly accepted later under pressure from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In January 1995, the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)³⁷, developed from PfP, began to develop procedures resembling NATO force-planning process. Under these conditions, most problems with joint exercises were related to language skills. In December 1995, the Czech Armed Forces were deployed to Bosnia as a part of the multinational NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

³⁶ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 111.

³⁷ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 89.

At the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8, 1997, the decision was made to invite three potential candidates, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, to accession talks with NATO.³⁸ The Protocol on Accession of the Czech Republic to NATO was signed in Brussels on December 16, 1997. Until April 1999, when the first accession was due, on the 50th anniversary of NATO, these countries were to be involved in Alliance activities to the maximum extent in order to be prepared for membership. Target Force Goals³⁹ were set for these three countries with specific tasks to bring them closer to interoperability with NATO countries. The Czechs were the founding members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and have participated in at least 27 joint exercises with the United States and other allies, including a series of exercises with the Texas National Guard. NATO officials have praised Czech military capabilities and the contributions they are already making to Western security. On March 12, 1999, the Czech Republic, together with Poland and Hungary, were admitted into NATO as member countries.⁴⁰ The Czech military has downsized substantially since the days of the Warsaw Pact and has adopted a modernization strategy with emphasis on communication, intelligence, English skills, and command and control.

Czech soldiers served alongside U.S. soldiers in the Gulf War, and a mechanized infantry battalion was serving with distinction in the British SFOR sector in Bosnia. The Czechs were among the largest per capita contributors to SFOR. The Czech military has also been active in UN peacekeeping and sent forces to UNTAES in Croatia and a number of other UN operations in countries of the former Soviet Union, Middle East and Africa. The strength of the Armed Forces on December 1, 1999 was about 65,000 soldiers, 792 tanks, 1,367 APCs, 740 artillery systems above 100mm, 204 airplanes, of which 110 were combat aircraft, and 117 helicopters, of which 34 were combat helicopters. The Czech Republic's first year of NATO membership resulted in a very positive appreciation of the Czech soldiers' participation in international missions in the Balkans by NATO representatives.

³⁸ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 114.

³⁹ Martin A. Smith, *NATO in the First Decade after the Cold War*, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 126.

⁴⁰ *NATO in the 21st Century*, (NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p. 12.

It also gained 50% of the trust of the public in the Armed Forces, which is the highest percentage ever achieved in a public opinion poll among Czech citizens. Nevertheless, there have also been problems concerning the acquisition of equipment, and the controversial posture of the Government towards the allied air campaign against Serbian targets. In February 2000, the Czech Republic, for the first time as a full member, passed NATO joint screening, which is a joint discussion of proposals, which will lead to Force Goals for the Czech armed forces. The Alliance decided to discuss about 130 Force Goals with the Czech Republic for the period of 2001 to 2003 with some perspectives in 2006. The Czech Armed Forces faced some difficulties. For example, the delayed purchase of the L-159 aircraft constitute over 70% of this year's investments and the percentage will be even higher in the following years. In this context, it is important that the Czech defense industry is gradually integrated into Western defense industry structures. In spite of the problems with the security screening of Czech representatives in NATO, the participation of several hundred Czech soldiers in international missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and the activities of the field hospital in the Balkans and in Turkey were highly appreciated. According to the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Šedivý, the trend of the future is the full professionalization of the Czech Armed Forces, which is primarily a political decision.

What the Czech Republic can offer to its allies, besides soldiers, equipment and training areas, is its experience with NATO accession. Within the Alliance, the CR supports the "open door" policy towards other Central and Eastern European countries. After two years of membership, the Czech Republic was criticized about its unclear policy regarding conscription, problems with planning and acquisition, as well as obsolete equipment. Due to the continuous problems, especially budgetary, at the Ministry of Defense in 2001, a new Minister of Defense was appointed. This is the sixth Minister of Defense since 1993 and every one of them had his own ideas concerning the reorganization of the military. By the time their plans were beginning to be implemented, they were leaving office. None of them had a clear picture of the new perspectives of the forces. The new minister started with radical and fundamental changes in the military. He was the initiator and supporter of the professional forces.

A Center for Reform was established, and a plan for the transition of Armed Forces to a fully professional force (AVF) was mandated by the parliament. In the words of the representative of the Center, the “New Czech Armed Forces should be small, young and mobile”. The Czech Republic, its political representation and also the Parliament, are faced with radical measures in areas of changes implemented in the Armed Forces and problems of deep and radical reform. This is the biggest challenge in creating democratic military structures in the 21st century.

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III. NEW TRENDS IN EUROPE

A. CONSCRIPTION VS. VOLUNTEERS

What is conscription and what is its purpose? Basically, conscription is system of compulsory enrollment of men and women into the Armed Forces. Conscription of women is rare, but there are a few examples from WW II. In Great Britain, for example, young single women were subject to conscription.⁴¹ The other example is from Israel. Jewish women were already subject to conscription at 18 years of age as early as September 1949.⁴² These women are in units called “The Women’s Corps” and usually serve in clerical and secretarial positions, technical and mechanical trades, educational and cultural positions, and operational non-combatant roles. Married women, mothers and religious women are exempt from service. The initial period of conscription was 24 months, but it was eventually reduced to 20 months. Reserve service is obligatory for childless women up to age 34. In actuality, most women are exempted. However, the basic role of conscription was and it is still fulfilled by young men.

Conscripts may be called upon to serve in times of peace in order to train for war or in times of emergency. Conscription is known as compulsory military service. In the United States it is called the “the draft” and by legislative enactment, Selective Service. This fundamental obligation of citizenship comes from ancient Greek city-states where young men were required to serve in the citizen militia for several years. In the early Roman Republic, compulsory service was regarded as a privilege and men between the ages of 17 and 60 served without pay. If a man did not serve, punishment was imprisonment and confiscation of property. At the end of the 2nd century B.C., professionals and mercenaries replaced the citizen militia. Conscription in its modern form was introduced in France during the first republic where universal military service was a Republican duty, and also a necessity for national survival. The men who had to serve were between the ages of 18 and 25. After registration in their localities, the youngest eligible were called up first and the others according to current needs.

⁴¹ <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWncf.htm>.

⁴² http://www.utoronto.ca/wjudaism/encyclopedia/ce_c.html - Encyclopedia - Collective Entities – CHEN.

In 1808, Prussia introduced universal conscription. In 1815, no exceptions were made due to social class or payments, and all young men had to serve a specified term of duty. In the 20th century, conscription began to become less useful. Compulsory education replaced military service and weapons became more technical requiring professionals to operate them. Armies, therefore, could not absorb all the young men of a growing population. As a result, abuses in granting exemptions and deferments became common. In WWI, the Great Powers fought with conscripted military forces. Great Britain used volunteers until 1916 when they resorted to compulsion. Britain abolished conscription in 1962.⁴³ The United States imposed the Selective Service Act of 1917 upon entering WWI. Volunteers were the basis of the Canadian forces until 1918 before they changed to conscription. Universal military service was abolished according to the Versailles Treaty and voluntary enlistment was established in Germany.⁴⁴ However, in 1935, Germany reintroduced the compulsory military system.

The British Parliament adopted a Conscription Act in May 1939, which established a system of peacetime military training. At the beginning of World War II, a law was issued requiring conscription of all males between 18 and 41. Peacetime conscription in the United States was established in September 1940. The Selective Service Act of 1948 was the basic draft law for the Cold War era.⁴⁵ Then, the same basic system provided manpower for the war in Vietnam. In 1969, a lottery system for choosing draftees was introduced. In June 1973, an all-volunteer force was introduced. Conscription is still used in some Western European countries such as Scandinavia (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark) Greece, Germany, Switzerland and Austria. It is the basic system for manning the Armed Forces in Eastern Europe. However, the growing reluctance of young people causes more of them to opt for an alternative civilian service if it is available.

⁴³ Brian Holden Reid, Michael Dewar, *Military Strategy in Changing Europe*, (Bressey's (UK), 1991), p. 28.

⁴⁴ William Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt, *The Burden of Victory*, (University Press of America, Inc., 1995), p. 27.

⁴⁵ Charles Moskos, John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The New Conscientious Objection*, (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 39.

Volunteer forces or professional forces are also known in the United States as the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The transition from conscription was the result of public opinion. More than 3,000,000 men volunteered to serve in the British Armed Forces during the first two years of the war. Due to heavy losses, the British government decided to introduce conscription by passing the Military Service Act.⁴⁶ At first, only single men were called up but by 1918, because of a lack of people, married men of fifty were being conscripted into the army. After the Military Service Act was passed, the No-Conscription Fellowship mounted a vigorous campaign against the punishment and imprisonment of conscientious objectors. During this time about 16,000 men refused to fight. Most of these men were pacifists, who believed that even during wartime, it was wrong to kill another human being.

The United States, the second major power, employed a volunteer system. The draft was mainly used because of shortages of volunteers and during major emergencies such as wars, and usually created opposition and riots. The first U.S. draft occurred during the Civil War⁴⁷. The only conflict fought without a draft was the Spanish American War in 1898. The last change to the volunteer force occurred in 1973 when a strong public antiwar movement from Vietnam War still existed. Both countries are still providing military service on a volunteer basis. Both of them also resorted to using the draft during WWI and WWII during emergencies. There are differences in perceptions concerning these two military systems and studies of these concepts are still being debated. In particular, there are studies provided by countries looking for more efficient military systems. In the United States, debates are still ongoing about the relative efficiency of an all-volunteer force and draft as are comparisons of these two alternatives. These issues regularly surface during conflicts and emergencies. The last time was after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The main policy question is how these military systems can be beneficial and what are their drawbacks.

⁴⁶ Charles Moskos, John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The New Conscientious Objection*, (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 68.

⁴⁷ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 49.

It is difficult to compare conscripts and all-volunteer forces either in cost or quality. Conscription usually means lower budgetary costs because of shifting costs from taxpayers to conscripts who are serving for much lower wages than volunteers. Due to the shorter period of service, they have lower skills than professional soldiers and generally are less capable. On the other hand, the social aspects of spreading the burden across all social groups to defend nations and bind the military to society are stressed. Since conscription is cheaper, the military can maintain a higher numerical strength. Conscription also tends to encourage reliance on very junior personnel because of their increased availability and lower cost. However, today's soldiers are expected to do more than just fight. They must also be able to accomplish modern peacekeeping missions requiring diplomatic, security, and managerial and administrative skills.

So what are the requirements of the future armed forces of NATO nations?

- Quick out-of-area deployment capability for sustained periods of operation
- Highly skilled professional forces
- Interoperability with the NATO armed forces
- Mobilization capacities with reserve forces
- Efficient supply (hospitals, transportation, etc.)
- Motivation and morale of forces deployed abroad

Another question is what kind of army is needed in the 21st century?

The answer, based on the experiences of the United Kingdom and the United States and other Western European countries, is professional forces. However, are they feasible for small countries with slowly developing economies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe? In these matters, the cultural and social perception of the military is a major consideration as are new managerial requirements and budgetary costs.

One definition of military professionalization is improved capability to carry out its mission, increased discipline of members and accountability for their actions.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ <http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox6.htm> - Professionalization of the Military.

The budgetary cost of volunteer or compulsory forces includes:

- Manpower
- Infrastructure
- Operations and maintenance
- Procurement of new equipment
- Research and development

All categories of cost are increasing and driving down the size of forces. Conscripts are relatively cheap in terms of cash but have a high social cost when taking into account that the young people are removed from education and other productive work. Conscripts suffer a low standard of living, need little support and are unaccompanied by family. Professional soldiers must be paid a rate comparable to the commercial world, provided with housing and support for a family. Otherwise, they will leave for better conditions elsewhere. On the other hand, the conscript is always available for service and gets little leave.

“We have lived with the draft so long,” declared Richard M. Nixon during his campaign for the Presidency, “that too many of us accept it as normal and necessary.”⁴⁹ Proponents of the draft argue that each citizen has a moral responsibility, or duty, to serve his country and that the draft provided a vehicle for institutionalizing this responsibility. Draft advocates usually stress affordability as well. The other concern is the fully professional, non-citizen force could be a threat to civilian authority and individual freedom. Also controversial, is the issue of lower income individuals, and individuals with lower levels of education, joining the volunteer force. Finally, conscripted forces usually have higher personnel turnover rates than the all-volunteer force because conscription generally decreases the average length of service.

B. EUROPE IN TRANSITION

After the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union, the whole atmosphere in Europe started to change. Also, reunification of Germany was not a big surprise when cooperation between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe was stressed.

⁴⁹ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 35.

The armed forces of European countries were no longer suitable for meeting new threats. Large armed forces, based on conscription and large-scale mobilization, and designed to fight in defense of national territory, were now an anachronism. In response, NATO countries sought to maintain their own sovereign armed forces with national chains of command, national procurement systems and balanced forces organized on individualistic national lines. The natural response from Western European countries was a decline in military budgets and expenditures. Since the end of the Cold War, European countries have reduced their armed forces from 10 to 50%. Organizations such as NATO, looking for new identities, are also individual countries trying to adapt their own forces to new conditions. Reductions are the consequences of budget cuts and the search for efficiency. New doctrines must describe new requirements and the needs of transformed armed forces better. New threat analyses refer to experiences from the Persian Gulf and the Balkans where well-equipped and rapidly deployed forces are necessary.

Today's threats to national security in Europe are primarily non-military in nature, although, there is a fear of a regional war in the Balkans. Overall defense concepts are no longer connected with large standing armies. The focus is on creating smaller, more mobile units for rapid deployment in crisis situations. Except for the British Armed Forces, all other European countries operated under the conscription system. This concept conflicted with the use of conscripted forces in out-of-area operations. The policy of countries was to use conscripted forces only in activities connected with the defense of their own country, which was inconsistent with out of the area operations. This solution is volunteers who are suitable for this type of operation. Some of the countries felt that the most efficient way was to create professional forces ready for deployment. When forces become more flexible, versatile, and capable of operations abroad, costs increase and the size of the force that can be afforded decreases. It is not easy to estimate the size of forces just by looking at the British forces, which are the most experienced operating volunteer force. Britain has had a volunteer force since 1962. Since the end of the Cold War, they have reduced the strength of the military by 30% and are planning further reductions. The first European country to abolish conscription after the Cold War was Belgium in 1992.

A few years later, the Netherlands abandoned the draft and, on August 31, 1996, achieved a fully professional force. Paragraph 1 in the Dutch constitution states: “For the protection of the interests of the state, there are armed forces exclusively consisting of volunteers and possibly of conscripts”. Conscription is still a possibility. During the same year, France started to transform its forces and at the end of last year became fully professional. It was a feature of military life for more than two centuries. In France, it represents a shift from the old Gaullist doctrine of military independence towards Europeanisation of a country's armed forces. It was a time for change according to President Chirac who announced in 1996 the transformation of forces from traditional conscription to a professional system (“Model 2015”).⁵⁰ The professionalization of the forces was accomplished at the end of 2001.

Spain announced the end of conscription and a change to fully professional forces on January 1, 2002 and is trying to resolve the problem of financing these forces. Conscription in Spain ended after 230 years. King Carlos III introduced conscription in 1770. One of the problems of this change was that 75% of the young men eligible for the draft declared themselves to be conscientious objectors.⁵¹ Portugal has a plan to introduce professional forces in 2003. Italy announced the end of conscription in 2005 when the Italian senate voted unanimously to abolish compulsory military service in 2000. They felt that their military should be more professional and efficient. They are planning to reduce the armed forces from 270,000 to 190,000 volunteers.⁵² It will end the long history of conscription, which started with the establishment of the country in 1861. In time of war or an international crisis, conscription can be reactivated. All these processes and changes preceded the announcement of an end to conscription by the Czech Republic.

⁵⁰ James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalition*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 19.

⁵¹ <http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200102140.shtml> – David R. Sands, Even Military Experts Consider Draft Antiquated.

⁵² <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,398085,00.html> - Rory Carroll, Conscription days over for Italy, (Guardian Unlimited, October 25, 2000).

Other countries with a long history of conscription, such as Austria and Greece, began discussions about phasing out conscription. Germany, for political reasons,⁵³ continues conscription but the length of service was reduced to nine months. More than half of the 300,000 draftees in 1997 chose alternative civilian service. They are moving towards professional forces very cautiously as conscription played a critical role in rehabilitation after WWII. Under German reforms, military strength will be reduced from 338,000 to 285,000 by 2004⁵⁴ with a higher fraction of volunteers. Switzerland and Scandinavian countries also continue to use conscripted forces. However, even Switzerland is planning to decrease the number of forces by two thirds by 2003 and reduce initial service from 300 to 280 days.

Until now, professionalization was mostly seen in NATO countries followed by CEE countries experiencing relatively good economic conditions. However, some NATO countries still consider conscripted forces to be the basic means of the country. Central and Eastern European countries (C&EE) continue to maintain far too large an administrative, command and military education infrastructure which is consuming a large part of the defense budget. The human resources system is not providing proper evaluation, rewarding, promoting and posting of information about key jobs, and there is no clear career system. There is a lack of competent people in defense policy formulation, defense planning and crisis management.

C. CZECH ARMED FORCES PERSPECTIVES

From the time the Czech Armed Forces joined NATO, many changes were occurring to fulfill membership requirements. Multinational peace operations are becoming more important for today's national security. Professional skills are required to achieve a high level of efficiency of troops in these operations. However, operational capabilities are reduced by an inadequate structure of personnel and over-inflated command at the expense of combat units. The Czech military in 2001 still has nearly half of the forces filled by conscripts who cannot serve outside of national borders.

⁵³ James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalition*, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 26.

⁵⁴ <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/germanreforms.cfm> - Emily Clark, German Military Reform-Moving towards Counter Terrorism Capabilities, Jan. 17, 2002.

Conscriptive service is becoming harder to maintain because of demographic changes. Even when conscription is a traditional form of service, many problems still exist. During the Cold War era, young people were forced to serve, and avoidance was seen as a violation of the law and punishable by imprisonment. After the revolution in 1989, human rights were more of an issue in society and an alternative civilian service⁵⁵ was introduced. This enabled young people of specific religions and pacifistic beliefs to serve their country without the use of weapons. More and more young people today are asking for alternative civil service, where they usually work as assistants in hospitals, clinics and elderly homes. Also, the social situation in the Czech Republic makes it difficult to man the armed forces. For example, only 15.5% of college students reported for service in 2000. With a new Minister of Defense, Jaroslav Tvrdík, appointed in May 2001 because of persistent problems at the Ministry, the restructuring of the armed forces started to become a reality. With the downsizing of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces, the transition to professional armed forces was introduced.

The Center for Preparation of Czech Armed Forces Reform was established and Major General Jaroslav Škopek was appointed by the government of the Czech Republic as a government commissioner for the preparation of military reform on May 15, 2001. The Center prepared the preliminary plan for the execution of reform in cooperation with advisors from Western Europe and the United States. The reform is planned in three phases and will end in 2010 with the modernization project of the armed forces. Table 1 illustrates the preliminary plan for reform with phases and goals established during phases in a tentative time frame. By the end of 2006, the professional armed forces of the Czech Republic will achieve the required initial capabilities which will lead to the creation of conditions for achieving the full operational capabilities in the future depending on the actual development of available resources.

⁵⁵ http://www.oku-fm.cz/info_obcan/ziv_situace/civilni_sluzba.htm - Právní úprava - civilní služba, Law Amendment about Alternative Civilian Service.

Table 1. Phases of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic.

Phase	Measures
PREPARATION PHASE UNTIL THE END OF MARCH 2002	Set priorities for professionalization, conduct economic analyses and assessment of available resources – financial, human, materiel
	Prepare a proposal for immediate termination, change or inhibition of projects, which are in contradiction with the reform plan
	Prepare plan of priority projects and programs to modernize armament, equipment and infrastructure in accordance with armed forces professionalization, continue projects already under way, which are in harmony with the reform plan
	Start intensive communication campaign to support the reform and professionalization
	Prepare the Concept of Development of Professional Army of the Czech Republic and Concept of Mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to be submitted to the Government of the Czech Republic
FIRST PHASE 2002 to 2003	Prepare draft of legislative changes necessary to support the armed forces professionalization and start legislative process, so that new laws (amendments) become effective by January 1, 2004
	Prepare reform implementation plan (by July 2002) – to be submitted to the Minister of Defense for approval
	Prepare intradepartmental implementation documents to carry out tasks connected with the reform (orders, directives of the Minister of Defense, plans)
	Implement necessary adjustments within organizational structure of top management and military command bodies (MOD, GS, dissolve operational command level)
	Continue already started professionalization of NATO assigned units
SECOND PHASE 2004 to 2005	Continue reconstruction and development of needed infrastructure
	Finish professionalization of NATO assigned troops
	Start professionalization of territorial and support forces
	Start implementation of modernization projects of the first group of priorities
THIRD PHASE 2006 to 2007	Assess and update the reform plan
	Achieve initial operational capabilities of professional armed forces
	Complete implementation of modernization projects of the first group of priorities
	Start the second phase of infrastructure development
COMPLETION OF AF CR MODERNIZATION 2008 to 2010	Start implementation of modernization projects of the second group of priorities to increase combat capabilities of mechanized division
	Complete implementation of modernization projects of the second group of priorities
	Start implementation of modernization projects of the third group of priorities to increase combat capabilities of air force and air defense (supersonic aircraft, long-range air defense systems)
	Finish the second phase of the infrastructure development
	Achieve full operational capabilities of professional armed forces

From: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/etapy.htm>
- Phases of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic

The process of preparation includes the creation of a “Concept of the Build-up the Professional Armed Forces of the Czech Republic” and a “Concept of Mobilization of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic”. These documents should be approved by July 2002 and be the basis for the Plan of the Reform and Directive of the Minister of Defense. The objective is to make the Czech Armed Forces an efficient member of the Alliance capable of fulfilling all tasks associated with NATO operations. The goal is to create peacetime forces with strength of 34,000 to 36,000 active soldiers consisting of 19,000 to 20,000 enlisted personnel, 8,000 to 9,000 warrant officers, and approximately 7,000 officers.⁵⁶ The number of women should be about 7,000, which is one fifth of the total strength, and 10,000 civilian employees. Today, the strength of the armed forces is 48,000 active soldiers and 21,000 civilian employees. The wartime structure will be based on Article 5 operation scenario against a direct threat to the territory of the Czech Republic. Expected reserves for mobilization are 28,000 personnel.

The Armed Forces are planning to attract 5,000 new recruits annually. The Czech Armed Forces started with the development of a new system of recruiting for future professionals during 2001 based on human resources marketing. It will be a new experience to compete for new employees with other opportunities existing in the free labor market. There is still a lack of experience with the integrated selection system involving medical, mental, and physical and motivation factors of candidates. The armed forces have created 13 recruitment centers and are preparing a methodology for selection. The selection procedure will consist of administrative, physical, medical, psychological and academic sections. A center for personal marketing⁵⁷ was created to support a centralized system of recruitment and selection. The center analyzes the labor market, investigates the attitudes and lifestyle of the young people and provides them with information about military occupations and careers, and develops selection methods and criteria for job assignments. The 13 centers are running experimental operations to verify methods and criteria.

⁵⁶ <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/reforma.htm> - Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AF CR) - Objectives and Principles.

⁵⁷ <http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/soumar.pdf> - Libor Soumar, Czech Armed Forces are Preparing New Selection System.

Next year, two selection centers will be officially opened. The role of military education is considered and the education system will be reformed to create the foundations for the efficient promotion of professional skills and knowledge. The idea is to establish an efficient system of education related to the career requirements of professional soldiers. The military education and training system is just now undergoing a reduction with a plan to retain one high school and one military university. The priority of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic is to better fulfill the assignments in a NATO environment, which is clearly laid out in Table 1 where NATO assigned forces are already supposed to be ready and fully operational in 2004. The public perception of NATO membership is more a passive joining than a qualitative change in defense. The public is still not aware of NATO duties and commitments, and there has been no change in thinking, behavior, cultural relationships and management methods. However, the reform of the armed forces should enable the military to face current security threats, as well as to provide territorial defense of the country and its citizens. Financial resources allocated by the country will be spent more effectively than before.

IV. ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Volunteer forces are now working or being transformed in most Western European countries. They are also being recognized in CEE countries and many started to compare them with their traditional conscripted forces and are working on cost-benefit analyses and other studies. The reason for this change to volunteers, the transformation of the forces and the problems associated with this change must be determined.

A. U.S. ARMED FORCES

The U.S. Armed Forces have been the most powerful force since the end of the Cold War. They are also the most experienced forces in both high and low intensity combat operations. Except for some compulsory militia training and occasional temporary drafts in wartime, traditionally Americans have mainly had a volunteer military.⁵⁸ However, conscription is as old as the War of Independence at Concord in 1775. Washington's perception of defense and its sharing is stated thus:

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it.⁵⁹

The rights and obligations of citizens were supposed to form the future tradition of participation in the armed forces. This concept was against individual rights and their freedom to choose. After the Revolutionary War, a plan to have all 19 year olds trained during three summers was suggested by George Washington. He foresaw, with the idea that every able-bodied man should serve, the future of conscription as a supplement to the regular Army in times of need. The Knox plan a few years later tried to justify universal service on the basis of a citizen's right to bear arms but it was never implemented. The government has generally not seen the need for large standing armies during peacetime particularly given the geographical position of the United States. In this light, they continued to provide defense capabilities through the militia.

⁵⁸ Ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The New Conscientious Objection* (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 23.

⁵⁹ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 47.

During the War of 1812, an attempt was made to establish compulsory selective service for male citizens. This law was supposed to be directly enforced without approval of the states. As this was a controversial issue, Congress delayed action until the war ended and did not approve it. Strong opposition to the draft came to a head in the New England states, where they refused to raise a militia and threatened to secede from the Union. At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln called for volunteers from the state militia but the three-month term made the numbers insufficient. The President renewed the call, but for three-year volunteers. Since the number of forces was reduced because of casualties, desertion and diseases and the enlistment rate was slow, the Militia Act of 1862 required the states to furnish men, and through a draft if necessary. There was opposition to the Militia Act because of the poor management of manpower procurement. The Federal Government enacted the Enrollment Act in 1863, which was the first U.S. draft law.⁶⁰ Under this law, an exemption could be bought for \$300. The Army used this money to obtain a substitute. Also, wealthy people were able to pay others to serve for them. Bounties as high as \$1500 were paid and out of 250,000 draft notices, 46,000 actual inductees were recruited.

During WWI, America enacted the Selective Service Act of 1917. Conscription became the main recruiting method. Voluntary enlistment was halted because the draft produced enough people. All men were classified into five categories according to their value to the civil sector. The highest category consisted of those who possessed the greatest civilian earning opportunities and the lowest category had the least. People from the lowest classes were drafted first, which led to the overrepresentation of the poor and blacks. Congress was able by conscription to raise a large military force without raising military pay and military wages fell more than 10% below civilian manufacturing wages. The potential threat of war in Europe was the reason for mobilizing the forces and the enactment of the peacetime draft – selective service. This resulted in a debate for those supporting the compulsory and volunteer system and those opposing it. On September 6, 1940, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio stated in a national radio broadcast:

⁶⁰ Harry A. Marmion, *The Case against Volunteer Army*, (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1971), p. 23.

The draft ... is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty, which have always been considered a part of American democracy. This country has always been opposed to a large standing army.⁶¹

Those opposed to conscription cited the Bill of Rights, individual liberty and historical tradition. The argument was never resolved and became moot with the attack on Pearl Harbor, when arguments against conscription were not longer relevant. On December 13, 1941, all territorial restrictions on conscription were abolished. The length of service for the duration of the war was extended and for six months afterwards and eligibility was changed from 18 to 31 years to 18 to 44 years of age. A year later, all men between 18 and 65 were required to register. Later in 1943, no volunteers were accepted in order to better control and organize production needs. At the end of WWII, conscription was incorporated into American society and citizen service obligation was accepted. The draft expired one and half years after the war, but because of the tense international situation and seeming inability to recruit enough volunteers, President Truman requested reenactment of the draft in 1948. At that time, there was a need for a larger standing army because Germany and Japan had to be occupied, a new military establishment in both countries had to be staffed, and mainly the communist threat of the Soviet Union had to be balanced. More importantly, as warfare revolved around more sophisticated weapons, trained personnel were required. Therefore, conscription was kept to address these threats and the tasks and size of the new military.

“We have lived with the draft so long,” declared Richard M. Nixon during his campaign for the Presidency, “that too many of us accept it as normal and necessary.” This statement probably reflects the way a majority of Americans felt toward the draft as an institution during the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁶² During this time, extensive public dialog started and the issue of the inequity of the draft especially transformed this debate into one of the major issues of public concern. The Vietnam War dramatized the inequity of the burden bore by some members of society.

⁶¹ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 53.

⁶² Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 35.

The number of young men eligible for military service more than doubled between 1955 and 1975, so the burden of conscription was limited to a relatively small segment of society. Therefore, some age groups were not required to serve and a smaller fraction of people bore the risk of death and injury. The draft enabled the military to pay less than it would pay volunteers, and also less than they could earn from civilian employment. Another debated issue was how much the all-volunteer force would cost and if the taxpayers would be willing to pay it. From a socioeconomic point of view, the issues were that a professional military was seen as a threat to civilian authority and secondly, a high percentage of blacks in the military came from the lower socioeconomic classes. Most attention to this debate began around 1966 when the DoD conducted a study of the draft. Also, the American Economic Association devoted a session to the economics of manpower procurement.

In 1967, two official advisory groups were established: the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service and the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement. Both group reports studied alternatives to the Selective Service System and both rejected the feasibility and concept of an all-volunteer force. The former report stated that a volunteer military was insufficiently flexible to respond to changing conditions, too costly, could lead to undesirable social effects such as erosion of patriotic spirit, racial imbalances, and possibly further isolate the military from society. The latter report confirmed all the major points of the first report. All public studies recommended the continuation of the Selective Service but there were other, unofficial reports suggesting an end to the draft. The report, *How to End the Draft*, sponsored by several members of the House of Representatives, stated that a volunteer military system is not only feasible but also desirable. Also, a conference of prominent economists and social scientists in Chicago in 1966 confirmed the same results in their collection of papers called "The Draft."⁶³ In 1969, after President Richard Nixon came to office, he announced the formation of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.

⁶³ Eds. J. Eric Fredland, Curtis Gilroy, Roger D. Little, W.S. Sellman, *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, (Brassey's, 1996), p. 42.

The so-called Gates Commission⁶⁴ consisted of a professional research staff of about forty and was able to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of the issues. The main goal of the commission was to study the costs and savings resulting from an all-volunteer force, as well as its social and economic implications. The commission researched a broad spectrum of issues and formulated answers on issues related to public debate. The main problems seen were the inequities of conscription, the undesirable side effects possible with ending the draft, and the feasibility of the volunteer force. Inequities from the draft received the most attention. Pay discrimination against junior military personnel was one of the main issues discussed in the report, which had fallen to about half of civilian pay by 1965. This form of discrimination was more than sufficient to reject the draft policy. It was the burden of being forced to serve when many of their peers did not bear the cost.

The first recommendation of the commission was to increase pay for junior personnel to the level comparable in the civilian sector. A second very important finding was that this equity pay raise would be sufficient to sustain an all-volunteer military force of up to 2.5 million members. It meant that the volunteer force would not require a pay increase above that recommended for eliminating pay discrimination. A third major finding is connected with the feasibility of a volunteer force especially with the budgetary implications of the pay raise. They found that it would increase the net annual budget outlays by between two and three billion dollars in 1970 constant dollars. It was substantially less than the 1966 DOD draft study of from \$4 to \$17 billion. It was not a true economic cost, but more a matter of shifting the burden of payment from young men serving to the general taxpaying public. In fact, budget outlays for a volunteer force would likely be less than the draft because of reduced personnel turnover, and so forth. Also, a volunteer force would eliminate the inefficiencies of the “conscription tax”. Thus, more savings would be attained in true social costs and the volunteer force would be economically feasible. The commission rejected the argument that abolishing conscription would lead to a loss of civilian control, relying on 200 years of experience with volunteers.

⁶⁴ Sam C. Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*, (Nelson-Hall Publishers, Chicago, 1975), p. 216.

They expected the percentage of blacks in the military to increase. After a year of intensive work, the commission recommended a volunteer force as a better solution for society and that a standby draft would be reserved only for periods of national emergency:

We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction; and that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in armed forces.⁶⁵

After the completion of the report and the statement of recommendations, the debate moved to the political environment. The actual decision about the future of the military was up to the Administration and Congress. The process started in 1971, when the Administration sponsored legislation in Congress for an increase in first term military pay. The legislation contained different timetables than those the commission requested. The Commission requested a pay raise on July 1, 1970 but according to legislation it was received a year later on May 1, 1971, and the requested starting date for the volunteer force was July 1, 1971 but legislation suggested a two-year extension of the draft to July 1, 1973. After the Administration and House of Representatives passed the bill, it was approved and implemented on November 14, 1971. Now the military was faced with the problems of implementing changes that were taking place in the civilian world. A change in the pay policy was the most important step to ease the transition to the volunteer force. Before the draft was ended, policies existed which helped to make the transition much easier.

An important change was the institutionalization of annual increases of military pay tied to private sector wage increases in 1967. The other change was catch-up pay for career personnel instituted in 1968 when pay comparability was established. The reason was to recruit qualified personnel for the career force, which meant pay comparable to the civilian market. Also, pay was viewed as equal for equal rank and years of service in the 1950s and 1960s.

⁶⁵ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 106.

However, there were shortages in some highly technical enlisted specialties where experience, education and mental aptitude played a very important role. Proficiency pay was introduced to improve conditions in skill areas experiencing shortages with additional monthly pay. The variable reenlistment bonus was for first time re-enlistees and varied according to specialty. Between fiscal years 1970 and 1973, the number of recruiters was increased by 65% and recruiting expenditures doubled. A manpower policy introduced enlistment options such as the selection of job assignment, training or a specific unit. Assignments in Europe were used as desirable overseas tours to attract recruits. Integration of manpower needs with grade control and career advancement were personnel planning efforts to create an efficient system. The result of these efforts was an increase in the number of volunteers from 1970 to 1972 by more than 30% and from 1970 to 1973 by more than 50%. Due to the inefficiencies from the time of the draft, attention was still paid to the volunteer force. With the end of the draft, much of the debate shifted to academic and military journals.

During the two years following, the AVF was the focus of debate, and the recruiting progress was reported regularly. Due to a deep recession, the third year proceeded without any controversy and recruiting was completely successful. This lasted until 1976, when the debate about an all-volunteer force was renewed. The first issue was if the military services could attract a sufficient number of volunteers. Since the army did not meet quotas in the beginning, the new force was criticized but after the first two years, all recruiting quotas were met. The failure of the reserve forces to attract sufficient numbers raised questions about mobilization capabilities. When the quotas were filled, another question emerged about the quality of new recruits. The increasing proportion of blacks in the armed forces was also an issue. In 1973 about 30% of new army recruits were black. The last issue was the dramatic increase in the budgetary cost of the volunteer force. Screening criteria were used to sort out individuals not expected to do well on the job. This screening consisted of medical, moral, and mental examinations and evaluations, which were used to assess the quality of recruits. The next question was how to attract and recruit in sufficient quantities.

Quantity can be evaluated by force strength objectives. The most significant problem emerged in the reserve force, where quotas were not met. Reserves were organized in three components: the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve were determined to augment active forces and consisted of the Selected Reserve mobilized and deployed as units and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) used as individual fillers of active and reserve units. Members of the Selected Reserve are trained periodically and paid for training hours. The Individual Ready Reserve does not train regularly and members do not receive pay and usually sign on for six years of service upon joining the active force. After leaving active service, they finish the rest of those six years in the IRR or Standby Reserve. The Selected Reserve acquires and retains personnel directly as in the active force. Since the IRR is not trained and paid, it is called only in case of war or national emergency. In the evaluation, it was stated that the reserves had problems resulting from the draft era but generally the Selected Reserves appear to be no less capable than before. The theory of supply and demand was used to estimate the ability of the AVF to provide manpower. The main factors were tangible aspects of military employment, dissemination of information to potential recruits, the employment and earnings conditions in the civilian economy, the population base and taste for military service. To examine demand, questions about recruiting objectives such as desirable force strength, attrition or turnover and what pay increase is needed should be answered.

The cost issue mostly attention attracted from opponents of the AVF. When defense budget passed \$100 billion in the mid 1970s, it became the hot topic and questions about affordability started to be asked. Since the AVF was under public supervision and criticism, the facts were misrepresented. The first mistake was a simple comparison of costs in the 1970s with the costs of the 1950s and 1960s. Past estimates understated the true costs. Also, the manpower cost growth was increasing long before the AVF, but the public became aware of it in connection with the AVF. Project Volunteer was counted as an AVF cost, but basic military pay was increased and it was more politically inspired than the AVF. The Project Volunteer account also included the reenlistment bonus, which was instituted during the draft.

It included costs such as education, recreation and other costs that would have been undertaken whether or not the draft had been ended. Due to the manner in which the budget was structured, the draft enabled the military to pay less than the economic cost for conscripted labor. However, the budget expenditures for military manpower do not necessarily respect the true cost of manpower to society and in particular under the draft. The supply of inexpensive manpower during the draft affected practices so much so that efficient manpower management and utilization were secondary. This led to resource allocations being driven mostly by tradition rather than by real resource costs, resulting in substantial inefficiencies. One of the basic requirements in the AVF environment became resource allocation. There are many technologically efficient alternatives for achieving defense missions, but given the prices, there is only one combination, which is economically efficient. Thus, the allocation of resources became critically important given the amount of defense spending associated with personnel. The problem was that manpower costs are driven as much by the numbers and types of personnel required as by such personnel policies as pay, promotion policy and career management.⁶⁶

Manpower requirements generally depend on force structure, operations and maintenance policies, the amount and types of equipment and types of personnel used. One of the issues was the substitution of civilian employees for military personnel made on the assumption that civilians are less expensive than military personnel. Factors such as personnel constraints, cost-effectiveness and tradition should be used to make a very accurate determination of job requirements. The proper mix of experience in the force leads to keeping experienced as well as junior personnel. The first-term/career mix of enlisted forces was especially important after the draft was ended. The manpower management policy was changed with the new conditions of the AVF. The first principle of change concerned equity versus efficiency, which resulted in a second-best approach. Equity concerns were based on the perception that military pay was lower than civilian wages. Thus, the policy “to treat everybody fairly” became embodied in the compensation system.

⁶⁶ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (The Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 269.

Personnel with the same rank and years of service had the same pay, even if the person was the base commander with responsibilities while the second person was a staff officer with no responsibilities. Since no efficient management existed, the military was forced to rely on less desirable ways of achieving the objectives required fulfilling the defense mission. The second principle was to maintain a youthful force, relying on plentiful and inexpensive first-termers whenever possible and use experienced personnel in supervisory positions. The third principle was the management of manpower done through the “course of least resistance.” There was no particular strategy because no matter what quality standards were imposed there was always a sufficient supply of manpower. The size of the workforce encouraged approaches to the promotion policy that were as easy and simple as possible to monitor and administer. Administrative simplicity became the most important principle of the manpower management philosophy. The most significant changes affected recruiting when the draft was ended. During the draft recruiters played a passive role in the flow of enlisted personnel into the military. This was in contrast to the new, more active role of recruiters in searching for prospective enlistees.

There were two main concerns in recruiting activities under the new conditions. The services had to define the role of recruiting. That role was not only to attract people to seek employment in the military, but also to classify the aptitude of enlistees towards military service, selecting them and determining where the enlistees ought to be assigned in the military. All these factors during the draft operated mostly independently, but the AVF environment increased their interdependence. The new job of the recruiter was to act as recruiter, classifier, selector and assigner in one person. The selection process was the primary role for the AVF. Specific standards and strategies had to be developed to screen out unacceptable candidates. Military training is an essential part of the military and became one of the most important issues in defense manpower. Congress is involved in the monitoring and authorization of military training. Two groups of problems were discussed after the draft was ended: training strategies and training methods. Training became enormously expensive. Approximately 20% of all military personnel were involved in training activities.

The military training establishment is sized by a number of factors: breadth and scope of military training, numbers of personnel trained each year, and size of the training support establishment. The first factor depends on the military requirements for manpower usually trained in-house in a wide variety of jobs. The second factor depends upon the need for the initial skill of the recruit and skill progression training. The third factor is the large training support establishment, which is the most visible issue in military training. The largest element, almost two thirds of the total, was the initial skill training for enlisted personnel. The extent and cost of first-term training depends on the number of personnel receiving training and the amount each individual receives. The key issue is how the military can increase the return from training relative to the investment in it, rather than focusing on the size of the training effort.

After individuals are trained and ready for their duty assignment, the problem of effective management and use of personnel arises. At this time, career management plays a role with monetary and non-monetary tools and policies. The most important factors discussed were career length, promotion policy and rotation. The regular length of a career after WWII had been 20 years. When shorter careers are possible, the military loses its most productive members. In comparison with the historical norm of a 30-year career, it led to higher accession requirements and greater training costs. No retirement vesting before the 20 year point is cited as a reason for losing qualified personnel at the end of initial obligation especially for people who do not want to stay in the service for 20 years. With promotion and pay tied to years of service, the system placed a premium on age instead of performance and capability. This limits the opportunities of young, bright and capable officers and encouraged them to leave the service. The promotion policy of “up-or-out” requires reaching the highest grade within a specific period of time or else be forced out of the service. On the one hand, some personnel do not wish to have supervisory responsibilities. On the other hand, the policy is forcing out less desirable personnel. In the U.S. case, the rotation of forces is a very important issue because of the units and bases spread throughout the world. The military compensation system is the most important policy instrument for the procurement and retention of personnel for the Armed Forces.

As stated, the main reason was to keep the military competitive with the civil sector. The main part of the military package was pay and retirement. Military pay is a function of how much is needed to attract and retain the numbers and types of personnel desired and how military pay should be measured. After basic military pay, military retirement is the second largest component of the military compensation system. People leaving the service before the completion of 20 years do not receive any retirement benefits. After reaching 20 years, the benefits are 2.5% times the years of service completed (max 75 percent) times annual basic military pay at the time of retirement. Retirement is a part of the compensation system and it is very important to provide personnel with the system so as to attract and retain enough personnel to fulfill defense missions. The establishment of the AVF was the largest public policy initiative of the U.S. defense establishment.

B. BRITAIN

The most experienced volunteer forces with a long tradition in Europe have been the British Armed Forces. Britain had a small army back in the 18th century. By 1802, military force strength was 151,000 men. At this time, the army was isolated from society. During the years 1859 through 1879, wars occurred in Europe involving all the major powers. This was an experience about the size, organization and structure of armies and usually peacetime forces ready for war. A large army with short-service conscripts was undesirable because of the long-term control of the empire. There was also a fear of putting arms into hands of unreliable troops. Nevertheless, there was no tradition of conscription and misgivings existed concerning a large standing (permanent) army.

Already, during this time, they tried to improve the quality of the army by making the military a respectable profession and improving pay and the conditions of service. In 1870, the government issued the Army Enlistment Act. The length of service was reduced from twenty to twelve years. Usually, half of this time was spent in a reserve status after leaving active service. The territorial force succeeded the volunteer force in 1908 and became the Territorial Army in 1920. In 1916, it became apparent that volunteers could not fill the requirement of 1.5 million men.

The shortage was solved by the implementation of conscription initially only for unmarried men. During the years 1918 and 1919, after recognizing that a large army was not needed, demobilization was accomplished. In 1920, army strength was reduced to the pre-war level. The economy and imperialism did not lead Britain to extend conscription in peacetime. The island environment guided Britain in the 1930s to concentrate on building ships and bombers. Only a small expeditionary army was prepared in case of problems. In 1938, Britain continued the policy of Home and Imperial defense without cooperation with other countries.

On September 3, 1939, the National Service Act was issued as a first peacetime conscription act. An Army smaller in strength played a lesser role in WWII than in WWI. More emphasis was placed on the Royal Air Force, antiaircraft weapons and administrative manpower was increased. After the lesson of WWII, the Britain deployed forces to the Continent. This time, Britain continued with conscription, which enabled her to not only strengthen Europe but also cut military spending. The National Service Act of 1948 stated that 18 years old men are eligible for enlistment for 12 months with part time service in the years following after service. In 1950, at the beginning of the Korean crisis, the length of service was extended from 18 months to two years. During the 1950s, the British Army was suffering from having to face heavy commitments under limited resources due to its roles on the Continent and traditional imperial peacekeeping. In the 1950s, the pattern of the Cold War became more apparent, and by 1955 had become institutionalized, with the Warsaw Pact balancing NATO. In order to afford some improvements in equipment, it had to somewhat reduce forces in 1955.

Severe economic limits were visible during the Suez operation in 1956.⁶⁷ Under these conditions, the need for change was evident. In the same year, the new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, appointed Duncan Sandys as a Minister of Defense with instructions to create a sound but economic defense policy. Parliament was told that he would have the authority to make decisions on all matters of policy affecting the size, shape, organization, and disposition of the Armed Forces, their equipment and supply, pay and conditions of service.

⁶⁷ Henry Stanhope, *The soldiers*, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1979), p. 17.

The new government was expecting Sandys to cut defense spending substantially and he wanted to challenge every function of the military forces. On the organizational level, the changes included the restructuring of the defense decision-making process, while the changes largely led to the termination of National Service, a reduction in conventional armaments, greater declaratory emphasis on Britain's expanding nuclear deterrent and an emphasis on the independence of that deterrence.⁶⁸ Sandys published a defense review in 1957 called the Defense White Paper. A statement announced the creation of a deterring nuclear force resulting in savings in conventional forces. In this situation, it was possible to rebuild forces that were smaller and professional. This not only solved the economic problems but also addressed strategic reasons. The relationship between the Minister and Service Chiefs was highly strained especially in debates about the planned size of the armed forces when economic savings were stressed without strategic concepts.

By 1962, the armed forces were to be reduced from 690,000 to 375,000 men and conscription abolished. From the standpoint of manpower savings, the administration had to be civilianized as much as possible. After 1960, Britain was the only European country with a citizen army. The army experienced an identity crisis concerning its self-consciousness about a service lifestyle and doubts about the opportunities for a second career. Some people felt that the decision to end conscription reflected electoral rather than strategic or economic considerations. Britain had experienced recruitment problems for an all-volunteer force. The reasons were low birth rates in the 1950s, the tendency for boys to stay in school longer and a demand for higher education, increased competition in the labor market and better training opportunities in the civilian sector. Recruitment in the free market on which the services had to rely posed difficult problems. In a period when full employment remained a government policy, the ability of the services to outbid civilian recruiters was highly limited, and often had to be related to non-material inducements such as patriotism, excitement and adventure.

⁶⁸ Ed. Paul Smith, *Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856-1990*, (The Hambledon Press, London, 1996), p. 217.

The new government from 1964 on began to shift towards a more coherent headquarters structure and an all-volunteer long-service military profession. In 1968, the Defense White Paper, in order to fight the aforementioned problems, announced intended improvements in fringe benefits and living conditions. Later in 1969, a new pay structure was announced which was fully comparable to the civilian sector. The X-factor was created which compensated for extra disadvantages of service life such as frequent moves. Since 1972, the non-commissioned ranks can enlist for three to 22 years of service with the freedom of choice on length and terms of service. This flexible option should have aided recruitment but manpower shortages continued during the 1970s. Recruiting started to improve from 1979 onward after the pay award was implemented.⁶⁹ Pay, pension and conditions as well as good equipment; resettlement; training and education to standards recognizable by civilian institutions all made the new professionalism work, but at a cost which emphasized that security, such as health, welfare and education, was a public good that was extremely difficult to ration or restrain.⁷⁰

Professionalization and the military salary were undoubtedly effective instruments in changing the level of skills and the self-regard of the military cadres in the long term. Today's pay of civilians and service personnel is subject to the government's public sector pay policy where increases in remuneration have to be offset by departmental efficiency savings. There is no direct linkage or comparability between civilian and service pay levels. The Armed Forces Pay Review Board and the Senior Salaries Review Board are recommending pay levels that are broadly comparable to equivalent civilian jobs while recognizing that comparability is an elusive concept and involves judgment calls. Non-commissioned officers can serve in a short-term contract for three to five years or open-ended service with a release notice period of up to 18 months. Their career finishes after 22 years of service when it is virtually mandatory to leave.

⁶⁹ Dan Smith, *The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s*, (Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1980), p. 147.

⁷⁰ Ed. Paul Smith, *Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1856-1990*, (The Hambledon Press, London, 1996), p. 244.

British officers have a three-stage career pattern with an initial engagement of 9 to 12 years depending on the service, medium-term engagement to 17 years or about age 40 and a full career to age 55. Rank is a major determinant of retirement. General officers can serve past age 55 but follow an “up or out “ pattern. Promotions in the British Armed Forces are based on merit, performance, experience, training, and the achievements of certain qualifications or skills. Each service has its own personnel system based on manning and funding provided by the Ministry of Defense central staff. Education is usually obtained from a civilian college or university before entering the military and non-degree military colleges provide individual training.

C. FRANCE

Conscription in France was first introduced during the French Revolution. Universal service dates back to 1905, when the drawing from lots to designate conscripts was abolished. The law established that compulsory military service for all young men would be equal. It was viewed more as a patriotic duty to serve country. The length of military service was gradually reduced and later the civilian national service was created and introduced. When compared to other Western European countries, France has not fully participated in the military organization of NATO since 1966 when President Charles de Gaulle withdrew forces from NATO’s integrated military structure.⁷¹ Its participation focuses mainly on NATO political committees. Like Britain, France is a colonial power with a long tradition of sending troops abroad. France had no shortage of manpower and through conscription had an excess of human resources. The country also does not import strategic missiles from the United States as does Britain and it has always insisted on national independence in the development of nuclear power. France describes the use of the air-launched nuclear weapons as a “final warning.” Since the end of the Cold War, France started to orientate itself towards European unification and was involved in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity. By 1990, France was still using the conscription system and that year a report estimated that the availability of 20-year-old men will far exceed requirements until 2005.

⁷¹ <http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/world/95/12/06/nato.html>, Roger Cohen, France will Return to NATO's Military Fold after 30-Year Absence, 12/5/1995.

France's new goals were shaped according to the experience of the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. Their forces suffered from a lack of modern equipment and a poor integration of conscripts. Military forces were dependent on other countries, especially the United States, for logistics and intelligence. It was a hard lesson for France and her forces with the Gaullist policy of self-reliance in defense.⁷² The lesson of the Gulf War and the new conditions facing Europe after the end of the Cold War forced France to better define new defense requirements and seek efficient solutions. The new policy of French leaders was to increase involvement in the transatlantic Alliance and to stress European integration. The rationale of large standing armies disappeared with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.

Other factors considered are budgetary constraints and new missions and roles. France is also a permanent member of the UN Security Council and heavily involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. There was no reason to continue the conscription system that relied on not very well-trained and underpaid conscripts. Realities changed rapidly and the Gaullist approaches did not fit the new post Cold War world. France was looking for forces, which were highly mobile, technologically advanced and quick in crisis response. The UK model of a volunteer force was closely studied in Paris. The traditional emphasis was on nuclear deterrence with a reinforced European defense commitment. French military planners focused on a higher quality professional force able to send more soldiers on intervention missions. All these aforementioned conditions led to announcement of President Chirac to move to a fully professional armed forces.⁷³ According to a report, it was decided to reform forces during 1997 to 2002 by phasing out conscription, creating more compact forces and reorganizing reserve and active forces. This started the most radical transformation of France's defense policy. Also, the public supported this change when, in opinion polls, 70% of the respondents favored an end to conscription. A complete reorganization of forces was to be completed by 2015 with an entire new generation of systems.

⁷² <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/bloch.htm>, George A. Bloch, French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army? Summer 2000.

⁷³ <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum94.html>, Ronald Tiersky, French Military Reforms and Strategy, November 1996.

The goal of the restructuring of the forces was a reduction in personnel from 577,000 in 1996 to 434,000 in 2002 resulting in a savings of \$3 billion. Also, 40 regiments and five command centers of the army, six air bases and two navy bases were closed. The reserves were the most affected by these radical reforms. Restructuring the reserve force created two types of reserve forces: operational reserve and citizen's reserve. The operational reserve will number no more than 100,000 men and women on a voluntary basis. They will be fully integrated with regular forces and will provide them operational back up. In 1998, approximately 430,000 men were trained and able to be mobilized in the reserves. This force was reduced and the new reserve force underwent refresher training. French law introduced the "route to citizenship" in October 1997 which was built into three stages: compulsory education in the principles and organization of defense in France as part of the school curriculum, compulsory registration and participation of young French nationals in a "day of introduction to defense and the French armed forces".

This law should ensure the participation of citizens in the nation's defense and a military connection with the civilian community. After this compulsory event, young people can decide on voluntary civilian or military service, join the armed forces or reserves, or undergo military training. Girls also became a part of the program with the same choices as boys in April 2000. The Citizen's reserve ensures a connection between the nation and the armed forces and their dedication to defense. The government tried to secure social and economic support for local communities faced with closures and unemployment. Redundant military barracks and facilities were converted to civilian use. To encourage public support for the reforms, the Ministry of Defense implemented an active policy of public information, recruitment, training and redeployment and retraining for civilian life. In strategic areas, forces have to fulfill the following four functions: deterrence, prevention, projection and protection.⁷⁴ Deterrence is a traditional element of French defense based on its nuclear capabilities. Prevention is playing an essential role after the conflicts in the Balkans and Kosovo. The main idea is to prevent potential conflicts by all political and military means and actions.

⁷⁴ <http://www.comw.org/pda/9911eur.html>, Lutz Unterseher, Europe's Armed Forces at the Millennium: A Case Study of Change in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, November 1999.

Projection became a new priority and France is now ready to deploy more than 50,000 men outside French territory. Protection is connected with home defense when forces are deployed or involved in an international crisis so as to prevent reprisals at home. Dividing a country into new military zones makes it possible to optimize military assets. On an international scale, Africa is a priority for France's actions abroad to be provided by cooperation arrangements and modernization and through initiatives for preventing and dealing with any crises. Upon reflecting on the Kosovo crisis, emphasis will be placed on improving intelligence and projection and transport capabilities.

It is the first time that President Chirac has left the longstanding Gaullist policy of self-sufficiency in weapon manufacturing. It is particularly in the field of satellite intelligence, command, control and communications equipment, and strategic lift where manufacturing is weak or nonexistent. France is also heavily involved in the building of European defense structures and strengthening its position in them. French traditional conscription ended on November 30, 2001 when the last group of conscripts left the forces after six months of service. This year France intended to recruit 10,500 people but is slightly behind this intention to attract suitable candidates. Presently, the MoD employs 80,000 civilians but that number should increase to cover the jobs previously performed by conscripts.

D. SPAIN AND ITALY

Spain has a 230 years long history of conscription from the time Carlos III introduced conscription in 1770. After the death of General Franco in 1975, a democratic transition has been occurring in Spain with the new President Adolfo Suarez. During his presidency, the Ministry of Defense was established on July 4, 1977, as well as the government role as a director and executor of defense policy. However, the real basis for the military organization was established in 1980. On May 30, 1982, Spain became the 16th member of NATO with the hope that it will help to control and professionalize the military.⁷⁵ The constitution in 1987 stated that citizens have the right and duty to defend Spain.

⁷⁵ Bruce George, Mark Stenhouse, *Western perspectives of Spain from Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy*, ed. Kenneth Maxwell, (Westview Press, 1991), p. 74.

Under a 1991 law, all Spanish men were required to register for military service at the age of 17. They were supposed to serve at age 18 but usually were called up the year they turned 19. This law approved the mixed model of military service for men and women and conscripts with a possibility of volunteering. In 1996, President Aznar announced his decision to complete the professionalization of the armed forces.⁷⁶ Recently, there was increased public debate about conscription and it was a key factor in the professionalization process. Spanish society is favorably inclined towards professional forces and a better image for the armed forces. In 1999, a law was introduced about the creation of professional armed forces. This law was supposed to suspend conscription by December 31, 2002, but not abolish it. Compulsory military service ended in 2001 with the last call for conscripts. Women and men have an equal chance of joining the professional armed forces beginning on 1 January 2002 when they become 17 years old. Women already represent 2.3% of the country's armed forces. The same law also established a system of mobilization with reserve forces forming the essential part of an all-volunteer force.

There is a voluntary reserve system and a compulsory reserve, which is called up when national defense demands it. Lately, there were several reports about problems that Spain has with recruiting requirements. Due to the booming economic expansion of the country and military salaries being way below those in the civilian sector, recruiting is a challenge. Also, there is one more condition, which will affect recruitment. It is the demographic trend, which was estimated to decrease by 40% from 1996 to 2006. The transformation of forces requires that about 25,000 be recruited every year. The Cabinet changed the limitations, which prevented female volunteers from joining the special operations unit, the airborne brigade and the Spanish Legion. Women are already in the training process of joining units. An effort is being made to fill the personnel requirements, which is somewhere between 102,000 to 120,000. In order to get closer to this number, the maximum age for joining the armed forces was raised from 26 to 28.

⁷⁶ <http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/michavila.pdf>, Captain Dtor Narciso Michavila, The professional soldier in Spain.

The other area of recruitment to be improved was the lowering of the minimum Intelligence Quotient requirements from 90 to 70 and applicants will not need to have completed a secondary-level education. It was also announced that Spain is going to recruit 2,000 foreign nationals annually to cover the shortfall in recruiting.⁷⁷ All these measures were an attempt to obtain enough volunteers and speed up or shorten the process of professionalization. These recruits are expected to be from Latin America where the language and cultural are similar. The change announced later was that instead of the end of 2002, the armed forces would like to end conscription at the end of 2001.

Italy is in the same position as Spain. It is in the process of transitioning to a professional force. The law, which will abolish conscription, was also introduced in 1999. In Italy, it will be accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, the number of regular soldiers will be increased to 42,000 men over three years while conscription will be phased out and the service will be open to women. The second phase ends in 2006 and will reduce forces from about 270,000 to 190,000.⁷⁸ The Constitution states that conscription can be restored immediately in the case of a crisis or war.

Italy, following the new European trend, is adapting the country's military to the new requirements of a country in Europe and NATO. It was assumed that there would be no shortage of recruits since 32% of those unemployed are under the age of 25 and it will be the only chance for them to find a job.⁷⁹ An all-volunteer force will mean higher salaries, improved training and better equipment for the Italian military. Defense spending is expected to rise by 50% in the next few years. Conscription should be abolished at the beginning of the year 2003. The first women officer cadets have recently signed up and by 2002 women can volunteer for every sector in the armed forces. Communists in the government argue that conscription ensured that the military was linked to the people.

⁷⁷ David Ing, Spain to Recruit Foreigners into Armed Forces, *Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 28, 2001.

⁷⁸ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,398085,00.html>, Rory Carroll, *Guardian Unlimited*, October 25, 2000.

⁷⁹ <http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/ital-s24.shtml>, Carola Kleinert, Andy Niklaus, Italy to Create a Professional Army, September 24, 1999.

It was announced that Italy is also considering recruiting foreign nationals to overcome a shortage in manpower.⁸⁰ The decline in the population is making recruitment challenging.

⁸⁰Paolo Valpolini, Italy looks to immigrants to fill recruitment gap, Jane's Defense Weekly, August 8, 2001.

V. CZECH ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION - NOT AN ALTERNATIVE BUT A CHOICE

Membership in NATO has changed military concepts and strategies for the Czech Armed Forces and produced new requirements. The NATO security environment diminished threats with collective defense playing an important role in the democratic development of the country. It has changed the geographic perspective of European politics and views on defense. It also brought up the question of our effective participation and commitment to the defense of our allies. The importance of directly defending the territory of the Czech Republic decreased, and the significance of common defense interests increased. Also, the new security environment diminished the need for large standing armies and large military expenditures.

The other related event was the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Paris 1990,⁸¹ which limits the maximum number of forces and conventional armaments. Thus, military conflict in Europe is very unlikely. However, operations and interventions such as in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans or Kosovo are more likely. These operations demonstrated the need for modern, well trained and equipped, highly mobile and professional forces. Aside from the defense of the Czech territory and NATO, member states operating in local conflicts outside of the NATO arena have become the most important mission. Rescue, humanitarian and peace operations are important. Operations are occurring more often and there is an increased need for professional soldiers.

A. POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Since the 1996 elections, the Czech political climate has been unstable and has been affected by the worsened state of the economy, the collapse of banks and public doubts about the merits of the privatization program. Increasing social problems resulted in labor unrest and strikes in 1996 and early 1997.⁸² In two years, the second Klaus minority cabinet and Czech politics, in general, suffered a severe loss to their prestige.

⁸¹ <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/cfee.htm>, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

⁸² <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=844005>, MF Dnes, Stávka železničářů působí lidem problémy, Railway strike causes people problems, 02/04/97, p. 6.

This was caused by a number of scandals involving the intelligence service, the collapse of the Kreditní Banka (Credit Bank)⁸³, the loss of NATO documents⁸⁴, the wrongful use of academic titles by members of parliament, and party funding of the ODS⁸⁵(Civic Democratic Party) and ODA⁸⁶ (Civic Democratic Alliance). Politics are conducted in an atmosphere of suspicion and accusation. During the election campaign, the CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) was accused of receiving illegal foreign aid, a charge that has been proven to be false. As a result, politics in general have a bad reputation, which is worsened by the many intra party struggles. The communist party and the extreme right republicans strongly opposed the coalition and made their position very difficult. This gave the CSSD an important role in politics.

The health of President Havel is a constant source of speculation and he is accused of confusing his role as a former dissident with the political neutrality of the head of state. It is believed that he has a position far stronger than the Constitution intends, thanks to his past and his continuing debates in the media. His popularity lately has fallen. However, crime is as much a problem in the Czech Republic as in neighboring countries. The human rights situation in the Czech Republic is generally favorable. One problem is discrimination against the Roma minority both by the population and by state officials. Many Roma prefer to leave the country when an opportunity arises. Rumors about easy entrance requirements initiated a mass exodus of Roma citizens to Great Britain and Canada. Most families were sent back, and in some cases, entrance visas were required for all Czech citizens due to these circumstances. The plan of the mayor of Ústí nad Labem to build a wall around a Romani housing block in June 1998 caused international outrage.⁸⁷

⁸³ <http://www.tel.hr/banka-mzb/96-09/6cry.html>, Vlado Bojkic, Cry Little Shareholders.

⁸⁴ <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=158016>, Jaroslav Kmenta, Jan Gazdík, Armádě se kamsi ztratily důležité dokumenty NATO, Armed Forces lost important NATO documents, MF Dnes, 02/28/97, p. 1.

⁸⁵ <http://www.new-presence.cz/97/12/news.roundup.htm>, News roundup, 12/97.

⁸⁶ <http://www.new-presence.cz/98/03/roundup.htm>, News roundup, 03/98.

⁸⁷ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_286000/286704.stm, Janet Barrie, Hiding gypsies behind the wall, BBC News, 02/26/99.

The remaining German minority in the Sudetenland sparks discussion when demands are made for the return of pre-1948 property.⁸⁸ The 1991 Lustration Law⁸⁹, which excluded former police agents and high communist officials from public office, was extended in 1996 to the year 2000 and continues to stir debate. The Zeman cabinet had to deal with the reform of the pension system as a result of the increasing number of pensioners, and was supposed to find a solution to the imperfect legal framework and unclear ownership relations surrounding the privatization process. In January 1996, the Czech Republic turned in an official application for membership in the European Union.⁹⁰

In December of the following year, the European Council in Luxembourg, following the recommendation of the European Commission, decided to start the intergovernmental conference on the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. Enlargement talks are continuing, and in 2003, the Czech Republic should be ready for EU membership, which is the earliest unofficially announced accession date. The President of the Czech Republic is Mr. Václav Havel⁹¹, elected in February 1993 and again in January 1998 for a five-year term. Prime Minister Miloš Zeman led the minority centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), which had a formal cooperation agreement, called the Opposition Pact, with the conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and his leader and previous Prime Minister Václav Klaus.⁹² Nevertheless, these figures and parties expressed support for the reform of the armed forces. Only the Communist Party opposed this reform as well as NATO accession. The government managed economic reform by adopting Euro-centrist, anti-corruption and business-friendly measures, including the privatization of many state-owned monopolies, to accelerate Czech readiness for membership in the European Union.

⁸⁸ <http://www.ctknews.com/archiv/docbene1.html>, Czech News Agency CTK, Prague, 1995.

⁸⁹ <http://www.ce-review.org/99/19/williams19.html>, Kieran Williams, A Scorecard for Czech Lustration, Central European Review, 10/22/99.

⁹⁰ <http://www.mzv.cz/EU/en/prepar.html>, Preparation of the Czech Republic for Accession to the European Union, 10/31/00.

⁹¹ http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/cvp_uk.html, Václav Havel, Curriculum Vitae.

⁹² http://www.vlada.cz/1250/vlada/dokumenty/opozsml_dodatek.htm, Společné prohlášení delegací ODS a ČSSD ze dne 14.1.2000, Common Declaration of Delegations of ODS and ČSSD from 01/14/00.

Czech households experienced a significant fall in their standard of living and inequality and poverty increased with the transition to a free market. Not surprisingly, the popularity of Zeman's government decreased, and Zeman resigned as Chairman of the CSSD in April 2001.⁹³ Until the next parliamentary elections in June 2002, Zeman will retain the position of Prime Minister "at the request of the party." The outcome of the next election remains uncertain, because the CSSD, the ODS and the centre-right Quad Coalition have almost the same positions. On the political scene, reform of the armed forces is perceived as a fundamental change needed to create an effective defense system. Until NATO accession, the armed forces did not attract political interest. Professionalization is one of the issues on which all parties are trying to show their creativity before the June elections. The latest competition between the parties to make a good impression before elections concerns a proposition to reduce the length of conscription before conscription is phased out. From a political aspect, professional armed forces could increase their prestige as a result of complying with increasing NATO commitments.

B. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In January 1991, a complex privatization program prepared and launched by then Minister of Finance, Václav Klaus, was adopted by the Czechoslovak parliament.⁹⁴ Citizens were allowed to buy vouchers at a very low price. These vouchers were later converted into shares. This voucher system neared completion in 1995. Contrary to the original idea to let the population profit from privatization, a large number of vouchers, about 70%, fell into the hands of large investment funds. A number of these funds have been run by major state-owned banks, such as the KB (Commercial Bank), the CS (Czech Savings) and the CSOB (Czechoslovak Business Bank). The Czech Republic was originally considered the leader of Central Europe's transition economies. Due to increasing economic problems in the past several years, this view has changed. During the second Klaus cabinet, installed in mid 1996, both the budget deficit and trade deficit increased.

⁹³ <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=469890>, Zeman odjel, přesto je členem vedení, In spite that Zeman left he is still in party leadership, MF Dnes, 04/09/01, p. 2.

⁹⁴ <http://www.ncpa.org/pd/pdint54.html>, Czech Republic A Market Success, NCPA Policy.

Problems occurred in the capital markets and a large number of banks collapsed. A currency crisis started in May 1996 and caused economic growth to fall from 3.9% in 1996 to 1% in 1997.⁹⁵ The Klaus government's shock therapy proved to be less successful than expected. Despite mass privatization, fundamental reforms of many unsuccessful companies have not taken place. According to analysts, the Czech Republic has been less successful than Hungary and Poland in restructuring its economic institutions and enterprises. Political and financial crises in 1997 shattered the Czech Republic's image as one of the most stable and prosperous post-Communist states. The growing current account imbalance reflected a surge in domestic demand and poor export performance, as wage increases outpaced productivity. The government was forced to introduce two austerity packages⁹⁶ later in the spring, which cut government spending by 2.5% of the GDP. A tough 1998 budget continued the painful medicine. These problems were compounded in the summer of 1997 by an unprecedented flood, which inundated much of the eastern part of the country.

Czech difficulties in 1997 contrasted with earlier periods of strong GDP growth, and balanced budgets, with inflation and unemployment that were among the lowest in the region. The consequences were the devaluation of the Czech Crown and the fall of the cabinet. In December 1997 the interim government of Prime Minister Tošovský adopted a fast-track plan to privatize banks.⁹⁷ This step raised doubts about the success of the privatization program, due to unclear ownership relations and the imperfect legal framework surrounding privatization. Tošovský's government also made plans for the privatization of the energy distribution companies and up to 35% of the Czech railways. About 80% of the Czech economy is now in private hands or partially privatized. However, furthering the privatization process was postponed until Zeman's new cabinet had been in place for some time. Real GDP growth for 1998 was predicted to be an average of 1.8%.

⁹⁵ <http://www.yahooligans.com/reference/factbook/cz/econom.html>, World Factbook: Czech Republic Economy.

⁹⁶ <http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num2/constitutionwatch/czech.html>, Constitution Watch, East Europeans Constitutional Review, Spring/Summer 1997.

⁹⁷ <http://www.worldbank.org/transitionnewsletter/dec97/pg5box.htm>, Box: Czech Capital Market Control--To Be Announced Later, Transition Newsletter.

In industry, motor vehicles and parts of the food industry are performing well against light industry, which faces many problems. Inflation was predicted to stay relatively high (10%). The Czech National Bank has set as its goal a decrease in net inflation from 10% to 5.5 - 6.5% by the end of 1998. During the transition period, the social situation received little attention. Housing construction dropped considerably. The introduction of market principles has led to private ownership relations, differentiated land prices, but also to further neglecting the environment. In January 1996, the government set the minimum monthly wage at US\$ 81, equivalent to 27% of the average wage. At this time, the main social-economic issues are poor health care and the organization of the welfare system. The retirement age has been increased gradually and is projected to reach 62 for men and 57 to 61 for women in 2007.

The Czech Republic is comparatively well developed, with large rail, road and telephone networks and rapidly growing use of the Internet. The literacy rate is 99%. A large portion of the population is highly skilled. The industries of the Czech Republic are varied and reflect a long industrial tradition. Agriculture, industry and services are 4%, 43% and 53% of the GDP respectively. Since 1989, industrial and agricultural output has declined sharply because of a fundamental lack of industrial restructuring. The foremost trading partners at this moment are Germany and Austria, although a large share of exports is directed towards Poland and Italy. Over 60% of trade is with the EU. The basic value-added, tax rate is 22 percent, but there are some exceptions such as most food, medicine and services. At the beginning of 1998, the VAT on gas and fuel was increased to 22%, while corporate tax was reduced from 39% to 35%. Tošovský's government intended to increase gas tariffs and rents by 27% and electricity by 24% in order to progress towards market prices, but Zeman's cabinet is expected to perhaps slow down the pace of increasing prices. The Czech economy experienced a recession during 1998-99. It continues to show positive trends, with a GDP growth rate of 3.1% for 2000 and 3.8% in 2001.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ http://www.worldinformation.com/World/Europe_EU/continent.asp?p=3&country=Europa, Eastern Europe.

Unemployment in 2000 averaged 8.5%, and 8.7% in 2001. Inflation in 2000 was 3.9% and 4.7% in 2001.⁹⁹ The monetary policy continues to be prudent and average inflation is expected to be within 4.5 to 4.9% the next few years as price liberalization proceeds. Banks forecast that low inflation would translate into lower interest rates and less income for the country's financial institutions. Personal consumption and investment are projected to grow significantly. So far, GDP growth has been relatively immune to the slowdown in the EU, but lower demand from Germany, the largest buyer of Czech exports, is expected to curtail growth in 2002. Attracting foreign investment to increase the flow of capital and expertise in the country's leading companies is a government priority in order to boost economic growth.

Basically one of the most stable and prosperous of the post-Communist states, the Czech Republic has been recovering from a recession since mid-1999. Growth is led by exports to the EU, especially Germany, and foreign investment, while domestic demand is reviving. Uncomfortably high fiscal and current account deficits could be future problems. The EU put the Czech Republic just behind Poland and Hungary in readiness for accession, which will give further impetus and direction to structural reform. Moves to complete banking, telecommunications and energy privatization will add to foreign investment, while intensified restructuring among large enterprises and banks and improvements in the financial sector should strengthen output growth. The Czech economy's transition problems continue to stem from too much direct and indirect government influence on the privatized economy, sometimes ineffective management of privatized firms, and a shortage of experienced financial analysts for the banking system. From an economic point of view, the creation of professional armed forces should result in minimal or no increase in higher personal expenses. In 1997, personnel costs were 50.4% of Czech military budget while the NATO average is about 58%. Reform success depends on financial resources available for recruiting and retaining military personnel.

⁹⁹ <http://www.czso.cz/eng/news/infrate.htm>, Inflation rate 1994 – 2001, Publications of the CZSO, Czech Statistical Office, 2001.

Reform plans are based on the preservation of the Ministry of Defense budget of 2.2% of the Gross Domestic Product until year 2010.¹⁰⁰ The limit of 2.0% of the GDP was established and agreed at the NATO accession talks.

Czech Republic	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001 latest
Real GDP growth rate, %	4.3	-0.8	-1.2	-0.4	2.9	4.0 Jan-Jun
Inflation rate-annual average, %	9.1	8.0	9.7	1.8	3.9	4.7 September
Unemployment rate, end-year - ILO definition, %	3.9	4.8	6.5	8.7	8.8	8.5 September
General government budget balance, % of GDP	-1.7	-2.7	-3.8	-4.0	-4.2	
Current account balance, % of GDP	-7.5	-6.1	-2.4	-2.9	-4.8	
Foreign debt						
• debt export ratio, %	3.2	2.5	4.1	7.4	9.9	
Foreign direct investment in flow						
• balance of payments data, % of GDP	2.5	2.5	6.6	11.6	9.0	

Table 2. Main Economic Trends.

C. SOCIAL CONDITIONS

After the Cold War, the Czech Republic started to create a democratic system. The most important goal was a functioning system of democratic and civilian control. There is a historically poor relationship between society and the armed forces, due to the occupation of the country by Germans at the beginning of WWII and the occupation by Warsaw Pact forces in 1968.

There was no response from the military. They were kept in their barracks as a result of government decisions. Therefore, it is hard to improve the public image of the Czech military.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p17.htm>, Prediction of MOD Expenditures Development in 2002-2010.

Attitudes of Czech Conscripts about the Army and Defense,%	1992	1995	1998
The sovereignty of the state must be protected in any case	92	64	81
Defense expenditures are an unnecessary burden for the state budget	57	43	50
If something happens to the state there is no possibility for an effective defense	74	41	60
It is useless to think about the defense of the state. The major powers will decide the fate of a small country such as ours.	51	43	57
Our army is well trained in operating combat machines	25	30	33
The population supports our army	14	15	23
Our army has a high morale	12	13	16

Table 3. Attitudes of Czech Conscripts.
From: S.Sarvaš, Informace z výzkumu č.67, HPÚ MO ČR, Praha 1999.

Also, local authorities are changing attitudes toward military garrisons. Some people have tried to demand the closure of military barracks. Lately, local people recognized that garrisons or barracks could make positive contributions to the region through the creation of jobs, taxes, infrastructure and so forth. People also remember the floods in 1997-1998 when nobody helped them as did the military.¹⁰¹ Help is also provided abroad in the form of a military hospital after the earthquake in Turkey in 1999.¹⁰² The Armed Forces are slowly restoring their reputation by performing extremely well in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. Also, NATO accession revived interest in military problems. The public is more aware of the burden of defense spending and more willing to bear it. People are more interested in the European Union, and the conditions required for accession. EU accession will affect the lives of more people with the creation of conditions required from this organization. The population is not diverse.

¹⁰¹ <http://www.army.cz/vti/atm/atm897/povoden.htm>, Jan Tůma, Vojáci a technika živlu nepodlehli, Soldiers and military equipment didn't come under natural calamity.

¹⁰² <http://www.army.cz/zpravy/cesky/2000/listopad/6s.htm>, Jan Procházka, Lékaři a sestry ze 6. Polní nemocnice vyznamenáni, Doctors and nurses from 6th military field hospital awarded, 11/24/00.

The major ethnic groups are the Czechs and the Slovaks each representing 94% and 3% of the population respectively. The Poles represent 0.6%, the Germans 0.5%, the Silesians 0.4%, the Romanies 0.3%, although of an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 Romanies in the Czech Republic, only 32,903 claimed Romani nationality so the actual percentage is much higher, the Hungarians 0.2% and others 1% of the population.¹⁰³ Minorities are usually from neighboring countries. The professional armed forces will benefited from the prestige of the military, and young people looking for a job will have more opportunities from which to choose. Law will be more respected which young people tried to circumvent by avoiding forced compulsory military service. One of the main issues is the decreasing demographic trend of population in the Czech Republic.




Figure 1. Male Population of Eighteen Year Olds in 1993-2018.
Source: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/prilohy.htm>, Documents on the preparation of the CR armed Forces Reform – Annexes.

¹⁰³ <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/czech/>, EU Enlargement - Country Profile.

Demographic trends together with the increasing number of young people asking for civilian service instead of compulsory military service is making it difficult to fulfill the needed number of conscripts.




Figure 2. Civil Service in 1993-2000.
From: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/prilohy.htm>, Documents on the Preparation of the CR Armed Forces Reform – Annexes.

Also, housing conditions are not good. Many people commute because of the lack of military housing. As there are no prospects for housing, people leave the military after several years of commuting. Many military specialists are leaving the military after finding better conditions in the civilian labor market.

D. MILITARY CONDITIONS

Until now, the Czech Armed Forces used conscripts with compulsory military service as the main source for an enlisted force.

However, a large number of people prefer civilian alternative service or try to avoid service all together citing various reasons. In 1993, only 43% of those eligible conscripts served. This proportion has decreased every year. Also, there is a decreasing demographic trend.¹⁰⁴ Compulsory military service is becoming more discriminating in nature. Some NATO countries still use conscription, but a process of gradual professionalization exists with the professional part on the increase. One of the reasons is that forces serve outside the NATO area, and the others are that young people are against conscription, and health conditions and demographic trends are worsening. The creation of semiprofessional or professional forces is a natural trend more than the will of legislators. An increasing number of European politicians realize this actuality and have begun to initiate discussions about fully professional forces and their future utility. The basic tasks of the Czech armed forces have changed, and the new tasks are so varied that it is not possible for them to be completed through compulsory military service. The length of such service is so short that it precludes sufficient training for the mastery of new weapon systems, and service outside the Czech territory.

Compulsory service is an anachronism from the time when victory depended more on the number of soldiers than armaments. Also, the issues of human rights are connected with compulsory military service. Opponents of professional forces use arguments such as conscription is a citizen's moral duty and that professionals are too expensive. However, this does not have to be the case, as shown in the examples of Britain, Belgium or the Netherlands. The main problem to be resolved in this process is a reduction of manpower in order to lessen the increase in personnel expenses. Past experience indicates it is possible to accomplish this without a reduction in fighting capability. The other important assumption is the motivation for voluntary enlistment. Since the unemployment rate is about 8%, it should be possible to recruit a sufficient number of young men and women if there is a good compensation package, available housing and decent career options. As in the Netherlands, it may be a combination of payment with education.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.africa2000.com/RNDX/rfl-czech.html>, Jeremy Bransten, Czech Republic: Drop In Birth Rates Spells Trouble (Part 2), RFE/RL, 10/19/01.

The new armed forces should consist of 38,000 to 40,000 men with about 5,000 officers, 15,000 warrant officers and 20,000 enlisted personnel. This force is expected to be better equipped, trained, motivated, smaller, mobile, efficient and capable of fighting abroad. The Czech armed forces have undergone many changes in the last ten years, including a reduction in personnel.

As of	Cadets	Professional soldiers total	Conscripts	Active duty soldiers total	Civilian employees	Sum total
1.1.1993	0	38 049	68 630	106 679	25 286	131 965
1.1.1994	0	33 282	54 326	87 608	23 634	111 242
1.1.1995	0	30 413	43 178	73 591	27 726	101 317
1.1.1996	0	27 654	36 797	64 451	26 456	90 907
1.1.1997	0	26 340	32 174	58 514	27 060	85 574
1.1.1998	0	23 759	32 942	56 701	21 797	78 498
1.1.1999	0	22 966	33 281	56 247	21 481	77 728
1.1.2000	976	23 721	31 185	54 906	21 301	76 207
1.1.2001	1 200	23 184	24 955	48 139	21 157	69 296

Table 4. Changes in the last 10 years.

From: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p07.htm>, Real Personnel Strength Development in the Armed Forces, Reform of the armed forces, Annexes.

Today, Czech officers serve at NATO headquarters and actively cooperate with other NATO countries. There is also bilateral relationship within NATO and the PfP. Frequent exercises with these countries outside the Czech Republic or exercises of these countries in the Czech Republic are the result of close cooperation. The Czech officers are studying languages as part of their careers, and the level of language readiness is increasing constantly.

There are many opportunities to study in military schools and academies in Europe, the United States or Canada. Also, NATO schools and courses are available to enhance the professional knowledge of Czech military personnel in all levels of command. In addition, the Czech military educational system underwent changes to better address new requirements for the armed forces. A new system of promotions similar to western European countries was created to provide a regular flow of personnel. Excess garrisons were dissolved to save scarce financial resources. The Czech Republic is also providing NATO with assigned forces. Of course, there are still many problems, which should be addressed during the transition to professional forces.

The modernization of military equipment and weapon systems is the second part of reform, and will take place after the transformation of personnel. Civilian control of the armed forces was the main step in democratic changes of the military and has already been experienced for a decade. The acquisition process is going through radical reform after the acquisition department of the Ministry of Defense was dissolved this year on the Minister's order. Due to an incorrectly signed contract on the L-159 "ALCA", this program is absorbing a large part of the military budget. One of the questions now is if the new government from the 2002 elections will support reform as enacted or delay reform. The Czech military has experience from missions in SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo. An NBC company is deployed to Kuwait and there is a military field hospital in Afghanistan. The military is also going through a process of security clearances because many people worked for state security under the communist regime.¹⁰⁵ Three years of NATO membership has caused the Czech armed forces to change, but even so, many problems from the past remain which reform can resolve if carried out well.

¹⁰⁵ <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=797344>, Jan Gazdík, Tři roky v NATO: armáda má dvě tváře, Three years in NATO: armed forces has two faces, MF Dnes, 03/12/02, p 10.

VI. ANALYSIS, LESSONS LEARNED, RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will analyze the reasons for the creation of the all-volunteer force, the reduction in forces and transition period as well as the main problems encountered during the transition period.

A. UK AND U.S. EXPERIENCE

Professional forces have been adopted for many different reasons. Modern professional forces were first created in Great Britain mainly for economic reasons. During the Suez crisis, British forces encountered difficulties in providing sufficient logistic support to military operations. After this crisis, they looked for ways to save money. Great Britain had to fulfill its colonial as well as its NATO commitments. At that time, their large standing army of conscripts was very inefficient, and replacing the conscripts with fewer professionals was the correct answer. It eased the government's budget and improved military capabilities. The idea behind forces without National Service was to rely more on nuclear deterrence and reduce the armed forces accordingly. The armed forces were to be reduced from 690,000 in 1957 to 375,000 professionals in 1963. Larger strategic reserves were created to back up the smaller armed forces.

The transformation process took seven years in Britain because of the economic situation. To create a professional force while reducing defense spending from more than 7% to less than 6% of a country's Gross National Product (GNP) meant more years of designing and restructuring.¹⁰⁶ In practice, there were some problems and deficiencies in the creation of volunteer forces. Britain experienced recruitment problems from the beginning of reform. The reasons mentioned in Chapter IV were low birth rates, a demand for higher education, competition in the labor market and training opportunities in the civilian sector. The free market posed difficult problems when trying to attract the sufficient number of recruits. Owing to the government's policy of full employment, the ability of the services to outbid civilian recruiters was highly limited and they increasingly relied on patriotism, excitement and adventure. In 1968, improvements in benefits and living conditions were announced.

¹⁰⁶ Henry Stanhope, *The Soldiers*, (Hamish Hamilton Limited, London, 1979) p 20.

Until 1970, the relatively low wages were supplemented by free board and lodging. The concept of a military salary began in April 1970 with a salary comparable to the civilian sector.¹⁰⁷ After 1975, income had fallen behind civilian income resulting in recruiting problems and low morale. Recruiting improved from May 1979 on when the new conservative government increased the pay rates.¹⁰⁸ Ten years after the UK, the U.S. forces went through the same process, but for different reasons. There was very strong social pressure because of the Vietnam War. The inequality of the burden of conscription was undeniable, which was borne by minorities and poorer people. The challenge for the U.S. was that it did not substantially lower the number of troops. There were problems with recruiting, which opponents of volunteer forces criticized as inherent shortfalls. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the forces was improved. Quicker procurement of more sophisticated weapon systems in the arms race with the Soviets justified the creation of volunteer forces and higher levels of professional skills.

Nixon endorsed the idea of an all-volunteer force in 1968 during his presidential campaign and he continued to advocate the idea.¹⁰⁹ Soon after inauguration, he appointed a commission to study the concept, and in 1970 announced professionalization with a completion date of June 1973. In the U.S., the transformation of the armed forces to a fully professional force took three years, which was the fastest transformation with many more people that needed to be recruited than in other armed forces. The number of total personnel was reduced from about 2,900,000 in 1970 to about 2,200,000 at the beginning of 1974 with the replacement of conscripts. This was a real challenge. They had to respond to the Soviet threat and were the leading force in the NATO command, with forces and military establishments all over the world. In the U.S., there were some shortfalls in recruitment, especially in the Army, in the first years of the volunteer force. These shortfalls were allegedly due to the tightening of quality standards, a shortage of recruiters in the field and large recruiting quotas. Also, in the beginning, all-volunteer force recruiting was affected by low unemployment.

¹⁰⁷ Henry Stanhope, *The Soldiers*, (Hamish Hamilton Limited, London, 1979) p. 36.

¹⁰⁸ Dan Smith, *The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s*, (Croom Helm Ltd, London, 1980), p. 147.

¹⁰⁹ Donald Smith, *The Volunteer Army*, in Martin Anderson, *The Military Draft*, (Hoover Press, 1982), p. 123.

Later, when unemployment increased, the problem with recruitment disappeared. Unemployment rates provided an opportunity to increase quality. “Civilianization” further reduced manpower costs by using civilian employees instead of military personnel. Also, reserve strength in the U.S. decreased from about 250,000 in 1970 to about 200,000 between 1973 and 1976. It was a reserve system created on the basis of non-prior-service (NPS) and prior service (PS) recruits where between fiscal years 1970 and 1974, NPS enlistments decreased from about 180,000 to less than 50,000. Thus, the traditional mix of NPS and PS of 70/30 during the post-draft period switched to a 35/65 mix with more reliance placed on PS personnel.¹¹⁰ The turnover of personnel was higher than during the draft, and one of the main tasks was to reduce the turnover rates.

B. THE BELGIAN, FRENCH, SPANISH AND ITALIAN EXPERIENCES

The Gulf War was the first major conflict for professional soldiers in coalition operations that stressed high mobility and quick deployment. As the Soviet threat disappeared, they enabled personnel (conscripts) to take part in economical and industrial processes. Soon after the Gulf War, another challenge for military organizations came with the Balkan conflict. In peacekeeping operations, professional forces again proved themselves in negotiations, enforcing civil order, and so forth.

Belgium already felt the inefficiency of one-year conscription training. In Belgium, the Council of Ministers decided on March 29, 1993 to suspend conscription and the last conscripts entered service at the beginning of 1995. The plan was to decrease forces from 80,000 to 47,500 personnel (42,500 military and 5,000 civilian) by the end of 2000. The process had to be executed with constant budgets and without dismissing any personnel against their will. The announced recruiting plan was not met, but it is anticipated that the goals will be reached at the end of 2002. The Belgium experience of a sudden loss of young people was due to an unfavorable budgetary situation and the policy to not dismiss any personnel against their will. The civilian population is losing interest in the armed forces. The military believes the unfavorable recruiting situation can be resolved by budget increases and attracting new recruits through better social conditions.

¹¹⁰ Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, (Rand Corporation, 1977) pp. 152,153.

A drastic plan for modernization towards smaller and mobile forces was created for 2000-2015. Although France started to create a fully professional force in 1996, the main reasons were recognized during the Gulf War. President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO military commands with the emphasis shifted to self-sufficiency. Insufficiency forced them to use a lot of U.S. equipment. It was a hard lesson for France to learn. The military leadership started to work on new strategies and missions for post - Cold War French forces. In 1995, Chirac's presidential campaign addressed the professional force issue based on proposals prepared by the military. A political decision with military support was made under these new conditions, in which large standing armies were no longer needed.

In 1996, President Chirac announced his decision to end conscription by 2002, and cut the armed forces from half a million to 350,000.¹¹¹ In France, the transformation was expected to be completed in seven years but was actually completed in six years through government decisions. France started in a manner similar to the U.S. France completed the process of transformation to an all-volunteer force in November 2001.¹¹² France ended conscription just last year and there was only one report available about a slight shortage in recruitment, but the reason is unclear. Spain, because of demographic trends and conscientious objection, decided to create fully professional forces at the same time as France. President Aznar announced his decision to professionalize the armed forces in 1996.¹¹³ Transformation ended at the end of 2001, with military personnel reduced from about 300,000 to between 170,000 and 150,000 in 2002.¹¹⁴ However, Spain, unlike France, had problems with recruiting and is still looking for more people. The strength of the armed forces fell to 74,500 compared to the target figure of 80,000 for the end of 2001.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/french-reform.cfm>, France: Preparing for New Types of Warfare in a New Century, Center for Defense Information, 03/13/02.

¹¹² Jac Lewis, France Completes Move to All-Regular Forces, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12/12/01.

¹¹³ <http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/michavila.pdf>, Captain Dtor Narciso Michavila, The Professional Soldier in Spain.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.mde.es/mde/docs/basicos/7-b.htm#2.1>, Dictament de la Comisi3n Mixta Congreso-Senado para la Plena Profesionalizaci3n de las Fuerzas Armadas, Opinion of the Mixed Commission Congress-Senate for the Full Professionalization of the Armed Forces.

¹¹⁵ David Ing, Recruitment in Spain Falls, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 05/15/02.

Spain is facing a lack of volunteer manpower and early on has communicated with Spanish speaking countries in South America about the possibility of recruitment. The main reasons are that military pay is much below the civilian sector, economic prosperity and highly unfavorable demographic trends. They tried to face the shortage of recruits in several ways. Besides attracting immigrants, the armed forces raised the age of recruits and lowered intelligence standards. In Italy, the process of transformation started in 1999 with proposed legislation to abandon conscription. Congress passed the law in late 2000. Regular soldiers will increase to 42,000 men, while conscription will be phased out and the service will be opened to women. The overall forces will be reduced from about 270,000 to 190,000 in 2006.¹¹⁶ Reform of the Italian forces is expected to take six years with personnel cut by 30%. To fill the gap in recruitment, Italy is considering recruiting foreign nationals.

C. THE CZECH REPUBLIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Czech Republic was interested in professional forces for military reasons when it started to structure its forces for NATO membership. Attention was not paid to the armed forces until the announcement of accession talks to NATO. However, after assessing the necessary minimum in political spheres, this topic was also once again neglected. The leading party usually occupied ministries such as finance, foreign affairs, and the interior with defense being lower in priority than economic affairs. New ministers were not in office long enough to affect real changes. None of the ministers was able to present meaningful concepts and perspectives to create an efficient working mechanism. Ineffective and slow downsizing cost the armed forces many good professionals and specialists. The old way of thinking and doing business made decision-making slower than expected by NATO allies. After joining NATO, more pressure was applied on commands to meet the new standards. Due to the inefficient system at the Czech MOD, conditions became more stressful and difficult. For example, there was still a significant amount of fraud in purchasing and acquisition. The purchase of the L-159 ALCA cost the armed forces about 70% of their budget. Ministers were criticized, but there was no radical change in the administration.

¹¹⁶ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,398085,00.html>, Rory Carroll, Guardian Unlimited, October 25, 2000.

In April 2001, after heavy criticism of the Ministry of Defense, Minister Vetchý was withdrawn and replaced by his economic assistant Jaroslav Tvrdík.¹¹⁷ It was on the basis of bad management of resort, which started to use strategic reserves in the case of an emergency. The new minister's first task, among others, was to prepare for the transition to fully professional forces.¹¹⁸ From his first day in office, there was doubt about those radical changes. The minister is using his years of experience in the armed forces to carry out difficult reforms. The main reason for reform in the Czech Republic is political in the context of economic problems and NATO commitments. The Czech Republic would like to carry out reform in six years. However, some doubts have already been raised. The new government can postpone reform by proceeding slowly, and hesitating, or by requiring additional documents. There is also the fear that the needed legislation will not be passed for recruiting new personnel.

A system of 13 recruitment centers is already prepared and has conducted experimental operations. Recruitment centers are supported by a center for personal marketing¹¹⁹, which is included in a centralized system of recruitment and selection. This system should analyze the labor market and help in competing with the civilian sector for recruits. Training and education is an essential part of the preparation of professional soldiers and should be connected with a career and promotion system. The education system is now being developed to consist of one military high school and one military university. The training system was designed in cooperation with the Training and Doctrine Command of the U.S. Army, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The pay system is geared towards attracting recruits and should be generally comparable to civilian equivalents. However, in times of low unemployment, competition becomes more difficult. Government support is now available to provide support with the correct legislation to enable a smooth transition. Not preparing for these conditions can threaten the defense capabilities of the country and weaken collective defense arrangements.

¹¹⁷ <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=441936>, Jan Gazdík, Ministrem je Tvrdík, Tvrdík is the Minister, MF Dnes, 05/04/01, p. 1.

¹¹⁸ <http://mfdnes.newton.cz/default.asp?cache=90755>, Jan Gazdík, Armáda je dál než úředníci, říká Tvrdík, Armed Forces are further than ministerial clerks, explains Tvrdík, MF Dnes, 05/05/01, p. 3.

¹¹⁹ <http://www.ehis.navy.mil/tp/humanscience/pdf/soumar.pdf> - Libor Soumar, Czech Armed Forces are Preparing New Selection System.

It would undermine our position in NATO. A career system was created for promotions and to replace personnel. It should work similar to the U.S. system of “up or out”. Also, the system allows full retirement after 20 years of service. A new and restructured reserve system should be able to provide sufficient manpower in the case of an emergency. The structure of the reserves appears in the following figure.

Figure 3. Structure of the Reserves.

The Czech Republic prepared the documents for transition to the government based on the experience of professionalization in Belgium and the Netherlands. Also, there was some exchange of information with the CUBIC, a U.S. corporation, which specializes in reforms to fully professional forces. After the approval of the new government, the Czech military is ready to start its most ambitious and challenging project ever.

The structure of the future force is provided in the following figure.




Figure 4. Structure of the Future Force.

Resource: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p14.htm>, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, Annexes, AFCR Structure.

The reform of the Armed Forces is based on the military and political ambitions of the Czech Republic. See the next figure.

- Full-strength participation in Article 5 common defense operation
- Participation in a single peace-enforcing operation with a brigade-size contingent (up to 5,000-strong) of ground forces or an equivalent-size contingent of the air force (starting in 2007) for a period not exceeding six months (without rotation), while maintaining the capability of receiving forces of the Alliance in its own territory and ensuring an active participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the NATINEADS system, or
- Long-term participation in a single peace-supporting or -keeping operation with a battalion-size contingent of ground forces or an equivalent-size contingent of the air force, plus the possibility of short-term participation in another subsequent and parallel operation (humanitarian assistance, disaster relief etc.) with a contingent up to 250 people for a period not exceeding six months (without rotation), while maintaining the capability of receiving forces of the Alliance in its own territory and ensuring an active participation of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in the NATINEADS system, and, at the same time,

- Retain the capability of fulfilling tasks in the territory of the Czech Republic arising from national laws together and in parallel with each of the options listed above.




Figure 5. Military Reform.

Resource: <http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/docs/p14.htm>, Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, Annexes Politico-Military Ambitions of the Czech Republic.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

In general, the reasons for the creation of professional forces vary, and usually are affected by the geopolitical situation. Spain was affected also by the increasing number of conscientious objectors. In both France and Spain, the decision to transform the military to a professional force was supported by the public even though the tradition of conscription has existed for a long time. In Italy, there was a political reason for the change, probably affected by changes around Europe. Generally, the transition process takes about six years and usually conscription is phased out sequentially. Also, it is possible to transition to professional forces, which are about half the size of the conscript force.

Of course, it has to be able to fulfill the new strategy and tasks of countries and it is possible with the sufficient support of reserve forces. As seen from the experiences of different countries, the length differs and is slightly affected by economic conditions such as the civilian labor market along with wage levels, and the unemployment rate. All this needs to be reflected in the enlistment package. The Czech Republic is just beginning this complex process but this process has been proven with the experience of the volunteer forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands in addition to the new cases of France and Spain. The problems experienced showed this to not be an easy process. It requires the support of the government and the involvement of society as a whole.

Many management changes are needed to create efficient and balanced professional forces. A need for new recruitment, education, training, payment, retirement, promotion and reserve forces systems exists. These are the vital parts of well functioning professional forces. Only under these conditions can society create a force controlled by civilians and be able to fulfill its tasks in a professional manner. Recruitment retraining and attracting new personnel in sufficient numbers is the main task of professional forces. It will require creating favorable conditions especially for the enlistees and non-commissioned officers who will replace the conscripts. An efficient selection system should be developed to obtain not only the correct number of recruits but also quality recruits. In light of historical experience and today's conditions, it should be possible to transition Czech armed forces if there is political willingness to implement reform by supporting and funding the transition plan. As seen from the experience of different countries, the length differs and is slightly affected by economic conditions, which have to include the civilian labor market along with its wage levels, and the unemployment rate. All this must be reflected in the enlistment package.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The world is experiencing great changes with unpredictable results. Twenty years ago nobody would have expected that the superpower rivals the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate and share military information, or that Eastern bloc countries would exercise with and share the collective defense of their countries with Western Europe countries and NATO. All this is now happening and began with the intent to halt the arms race and to demonstrate the desire to cooperate. The communist regime had collapsed and its successors must start from scratch to attempt to approach the conditions and life style of the Western countries. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union, brand new countries are looking for new identities. One of them is the Czech Republic, which in 1989 was a part of the Czechoslovak state that overthrew the communist government in the so-called “Velvet Revolution”. Defense institutions in Europe, the United States and Canada were downsizing. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact also resulted in severe downsizing in Eastern European countries.

Countries with conscripts began to shorten the length of service due to public pressure. The main reason was to help weakened economies. In 1990, the world community had to conduct common operations during the Gulf War. Cooperation and common strategy and tactics were essential to achieve operational goals. For the first time, some countries had a chance to cooperate with NATO forces. Also, France recognized the fundamental deficiencies in this type of mission. It was difficult for France to send the assigned number of people. Great Britain was able to send twice as many troops. The second problem was the lack of equipment used in this type of conflict. French self-esteem, a result of the Gaullist self-sufficiency policy, suffered. A Czech NBC Company, with a strength of 170 men, was able for the first time to work in a joint environment in Kuwait, and their participation resulted in positive outcomes. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republics were only an interim state, and could not prevent the growing disagreement between the strongest parties after the 1992 elections.

Another event was the crisis in Yugoslavia. In February 1992, the UNPROFOR force was established. The UN worked in cooperation with NATO forces. The Czech Republic was one of the countries involved. After the so-called “Velvet Divorce” two new independent states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, emerged after 1 January 1993. The Czech Republic sought a stable, democratic type of government to ensure stability and prosperity. President Václav Havel started to develop good relations with neighboring countries and to incorporate the Czech Republic into the European community. One of the main concerns was security and defense. The armed forces were reduced to save some money. The main focus was on economic reforms and privatization. Slow changes in the military with no clear direction led to a loss of specialists, managers and leaders. The military had obsolete weapons, out-of-date manuals and budget restrictions. One positive change was the creation of a civilian control system. The lack of public interest made it possible for people from other parties to attain the post of Defense Minister due to the lack of attention from the strongest party. In 1993, a concept for the development of the armed forces of the Czech Republic, to be implemented by 1996, was drafted, but due to budget restrictions, implementation has been delayed.

In Belgium, the decision was made to create professional forces in 1993, in order to better fulfill new types of missions. Countries with a history of all-volunteer forces, such as the United States and Great Britain, were very efficient and were able to send forces anywhere very quickly. In 1994, the Czech Republic started to actively work in the new framework of the Partnership for Peace. It was important to create a European security environment. In December 1995, the Czech Armed Forces were participating in Bosnia as a part of the multinational NATO-led peace force IFOR. The Netherlands abandoned conscription in 1996. At the same time, France announced the transformation to an all-volunteer force by 2002. The new trend was followed by Spain in the same year. The Czech public started to renew its interest in armed forces after an invitation to talks about NATO accession in 1997. NATO assigned tasks to the Czech Republic and other potential new members requiring NATO language training and NATO military procedures.

Also, everybody had to undergo a security clearance process, which was supposed to eliminate people who had worked for the state police. NATO standards were adopted and a new process of restructuring started. The main emphasis was on NATO - assigned forces. On Wednesday, 24 March 1999, NATO began air strikes against Serbian military targets in Yugoslavia in response to Serb actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This conflict amply proved the need for small, well-trained, well-equipped, and quickly deployable forces. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were all accepted as new NATO member states. There were still some problems and double standards were created in the armed forces. On the one hand, soldiers in NATO missions had the best equipment, but sometimes forces at home lacked equipment. People in missions abroad were highly valued and appreciated, while forces at home endured average and worse conditions. Also, Czech officers started to serve at NATO headquarters. Problems in planning, acquisition and obsolete equipment not compatible with NATO negatively affected progress. In addition, conscription was increasingly a problem. Demographic trends are unfavorable, and there is less interest in military service. Young people are choosing alternative civilian service. The Prime Minister had to withdraw the Minister of Defense and replace him with his economic deputy. His task is to create professional forces.

The new Minister started radical changes and a Center for Reform was created and tasked with creating a transformation plan. The study for the transition of forces is prepared and reorganization is already proceeding in education and training systems. A new recruitment system is currently being tested. These are the circumstance now facing the Czech Republic, which is now at a point where a new government can decide further steps for reform. Who will win the elections is not clear, and there are fears that the new government can delay the whole process through budget cuts, or not passing the necessary legislation supporting the new military system. The new European trend is clear. What is the experience of countries already using an all-volunteer system? The oldest volunteer system is in Britain and this system is working well but there were some problems when reform began. They had problems with recruiting and they had to adjust salaries to retain a sufficient number of people. In the United States, they had problems attracting non-prior-service recruits to the reserves.

Spain is experiencing recruitment problems. One problem is insufficient salaries in comparison with the civilian labor market. Spain is looking into other possibilities, such as recruiting immigrants because of the very low birth rate. In Belgium, there are budgetary problems, and financial incentives are not attracting new recruits. Belgium will go through a further reduction of forces. Enough information exists on what needs to be done, but budgetary constraints may preclude attracting enough recruits. Why is conscription not an effective system under these new conditions? There are many problems with conscription. First, it is perceived to be discriminatory in nature and many young people are opposed to serving. They feel that it is not a free choice. Due to this discriminating disposition, conscripts are not able to perform their best, and they do not know why they should have to. When alternative civilian service began, it was possible to choose, but young people prefer alternative to compulsory service. The main reason is the service's new character, which should handle disasters, terrorist actions and emergencies. Another problem is the short length of service does not provide enough time to undergo training and then apply the training. Usually they leave the service soon after they are trained.

The main deficiency of conscripts in the new military environment is that they are not deployable abroad. From an economic point of view, conscription is a burden for a country because recruits could be more beneficial to the economy in the civilian labor market. None of the countries entirely abandoned conscription. Usually there are clauses in the constitutions that permit conscription in the case of need. The biggest advantage of an all-volunteer force is highly skilled professional soldiers ready for deployment anywhere in the world. It is cheaper than conscription in terms of training since the service period is longer and therefore money spent on training is better utilized. The professional soldier can be used outside the area of the operation, while the main task of conscripts is national defense inside national borders. Professional forces are more motivated. These conditions make the professional soldier the most effective alternative for future warfare. Are the Czech Republic and its armed forces ready for the transition to professional forces? There were signals from politicians that they understand the need and would support professional armed forces. However, these conditions can change after upcoming elections.

Economically, conditions can be favorable if the budget for armed forces is preserved at 2.2% of the GDP and 8% unemployment continues. Social conditions are favorable and people in general are supporting changes to the military system. Still, there are problems, which should be addressed by legislation, especially in housing. The military had studied transformation, and has studied and consulted with foreign military experts. After the first stage of reform, a second stage should be focused on the modernization of equipment. The Czech armed forces and military officials announced that they are ready to start reform. From historical perspectives, there are inevitable questions. Will NATO disappear or will there be one force for all of Europe? We can speculate but we cannot answer these questions. However, it is certain that the Czech armed forces are writing their own new history.

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